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Articles
Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and
the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case
Study in Constitutional Argument
James A. Gardner*
I. The Character Thesis
Among the more common techniques of American constitutional
argument is the resort to "character" as an aid to interpreting the United
States Constitution. Character-based arguments seek to justify a particular
interpretation of the Constitution on the ground that it is more consistent
than competing interpretations with the character of Americans or with the
values that Americans, in consequence of their character, hold dear. Philip
Bobbitt, who calls such arguments "ethical," describes them as arguments
"whose force relies on a characterization of American institutions and the
role within them of the American people. It is the character, or ethos, of
the American polity that is advanced in ethical argument as the source from
which particular decisions derive."'
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A. 1980, Yale University;
J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. My thanks to Jack Chin, Dick Cole, Dave Douglas, Eric Gouvin,
Chris lijima, Jim Gordon, Paul Kahn, Joan Mahoney, Jay Mootz, Monte Piliawsky, and Bob Williams
for valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors or shortcomings are my responsibility
alone. I am deeply indebted to Michelle Dill LaRose and Pat Newcombe of the Western New England
College Law Library for exceptional assistance in tracking down historical sources and data. Thanks
also to Marion Chandler of the South Carolina Department of Archives and History for assistance with
South Carolina data.
1. PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94 (1982).
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The plausibility of character-based argument derives principally from
a familiar and widely accepted underlying conception of the Constitution.
On this view, the Constitution is understood to be a self-conscious act of
social definition by the American polity.2 Because the Constitution func-
tions as a democratic expression of American aspirations for good and
enduring self-government, it therefore by definition embodies the values
that Americans understand themselves to hold. Moreover, as a document
commanding governmental obedience to the popular will,3 the Constitution
secures the integrity of American life by assuring that the organs of Amer-
ican government act consistently with fundamental American norms. A
dual relationship consequently arises: the Constitution both expresses and
shapes American character.4 Character-based arguments exploit this model
to find meaning in the Constitution's otherwise vague injunctions. They
do so by making assertions about the content of American character and
from them deducing the meaning of the Constitution in concrete
applications.
The presence of a character-based argument is often revealed by a
proposition to the effect that "Americans are a people who"-who are of
a certain kind, who behave in certain ways, or who hold certain beliefs or
values. Sometimes these propositions are advanced explicitly, as in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as "draw[ing] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."' At other times the reliance on character may be
2. See U.S. CONSr. preamble (declaring that the Constitution was created by the people of the
United States); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (theorizing that because the
American people actively assented to the Constitution through the constitutional ratification conventions,
the government created by the Constitution represents all of America).
3. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (noting that the Constitution creates
a binding, judicially enforceable obligation of obedience on government officials).
4. As Robert Post has written, "Constitutional law is fundamental because it reflects and embodies
the essential political ethos that makes governance possible within a particular culture." Robert C.
Post, The Challenge of State Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING
STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 45, 45 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds.,
1995); see also BOBBHT, supra note 1, at 94-95 (arguing that ethical constitutional arguments use the
character of the American people to provide solutions that are consistent with desired means to solve
political problems); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 217 (1990) (stating that law is
made in the process of writing and that "we are made by the very language that we use"); JAMES
BOYD WHITE, Reading Law and Reading Literature: Law as Language, in HERACLES' Bow 77, 80
(1985) (proposing that instead of a community giving meaning to a text, it is the text that creates the
community); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreward: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-40 (1983) (discussing the proposition that the creation of legal meaning takes
place through a cultural medium); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for the Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 (1989) (describing how legal stories circulated among
groups represent the cohesion, shared understandings, and meanings held by those groups). The role
of the Constitution in American public life is thoroughly examined in MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE
THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF (1986).
5. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The role of character in constitutional adjudication
sparked a sharp exchange in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justices O'Connor,
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more subtle, as in the Court's horrified rejection of legislation prohibiting
the use of contraceptives by married couples.6 But all such arguments
appeal in some way to the belief that the best constitutional interpretation
is one that "comports with the sort of people we are and the means we
have chosen to solve political and customary constitutional problems." 7
Although not without its critics,' the technique of appealing to Amer-
ican character seems to be a settled feature of American constitutional
argument. 9 Less settled, however, is the practice of applying character-
based argument to the interpretation of state constitutions. In numerous
scholarly articles and a few influential judicial opinions, advocates of what
has come to be known as New Judicial Federalism have urged state courts
to treat the character and values of the people of their states as sources of
constitutional meaning. 10 Just as the character of the American people
infuses the national Constitution, so too, they claim, does the character of
the people of a state infuse the state charter. Thus, we are told, a state
constitution is a "mirror of fundamental values"" of the people of the
state, one that expresses "the basic values of the polity."" A state's
Kennedy, and Souter in a portion of their opinion that was the opinion of the Court, argued that the
Court must adhere to precedent and principle to be faithful to "the character of a Nation of people who
aspire to live according to the rule of law." Id. at 868. Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices,
ridiculed this contention as a "Nietzschean vision" of unelected judges "leading a Volk" whose self-
understanding is "mystically bound up" in their beliefs about the Supreme Court. Id. at 996 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (classifying the "sacred" marital
relationship as protected by the zone of privacy and noting that "[tihe very idea [of policing married
couples' use of contraception] is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship").
7. BOBBrrT, supra note 1, at 95.
8. Naturally, anyone-like textualists or originalists-who thinks that constitutional meaning is to
be found exclusively in the text or intentions of the framers, will dispute the legitimacy of this
technique. Justice Scalia, for example, a noted originalist, has criticized it severely. See Casey, 505
U.S. at 980 & n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that abortion is not
a constitutionally protected liberty and criticizing Roe v. Wade because it "sought to establish-in the
teeth of a clear, contrary tradition-a value found nowhere in the constitutional text" (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original)).
9. See BOBBr, supra note 1, at 96- 9 (discussing several Supreme Court cases that adopt ethical
reasoning). Bobbitt views the use of an interpretational technique as self-legitimating. See id. at 5.
10. The literature on the New Judicial Federalism has in recent years become unmanageably large.
See generally James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MiCH. L. REV.
761,771-77 (1992); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1097 (1997) (both providing a historical overview of the revival of interest in state constitutional
law). Numerous recent symposia have been devoted to the topic. For a recent example, see The New
Judicial Federalism: A New Generation Symposium Issue, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421-620 (1996).
Additional valuable contributions can be found in the special issues on state constitutional law published
annually by the Rutgers Law Journal and the Temple Law Review.
11. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 938-39 (1976).
12. H.C. Macgill, Upon a Peak in Darien: Discovering the Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN.
L. REV. 7, 11 (1982).
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constitutional law becomes, on this view, "uniquely expressive of that
state's own constitutional culture."13 In sum,
no function of a constitution, especially in the American states, is
more important than its use in defining a people's aspirations and
fundamental values... . A state constitution is a fit place for the
people of a state to record their moral values, their definition of
justice, their hopes for the common good. A state constitution
defines a way of life.14
The use of character-based argument in the interpretation of state
constitutions would not be especially noteworthy were it not for an addi-
tional step taken by many advocates of New Judicial Federalism: they fre-
quently claim that the characters and values of the people of the various
states differ both from one another and from the character and values of
Americans generally. For example, Judith Kaye, now Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, has claimed that "[m]any states today espouse
cultural values distinctively their own.""5 New York's constitution, she
contends, "reflects the geography, history, culture and uniqueness of our
state."6 Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson agrees:
a state's constitution must be interpreted in light of its "peculiarities,"
including "its land, its industry, its people, [and] its history."1 7 Robert
Utter, former Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, has made the
same point: his state's constitution, he argues, must be interpreted in view
of "the vast differences in culture, politics, experience, education and
economic status" between the state and national founding generations."
This contention has dramatic implications for the interpretation of state
constitutions. It means that courts and lawyers cannot approach a state's
constitution under the assumption that it embodies the same kinds of broad
value judgments as would be made by Americans as a group-the kind with
which we are all familiar from federal constitutional law. Instead, each
state constitution must be approached individually and a careful assessment
made of the basic character of the people of the state. Only once such an
evaluation has been made is it possible to formulate conclusions about the
13. Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream:An Introduction to the VermontLaw Review Symposium
on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 19 (1988).
14. A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST.
CONST. L. 1, 14 (1988).
15. Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 399,
423 (1987).
16. Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, I
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17, 19 (1988).
17. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 965 (1982).
18. Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the WashingtonDeclaration of Rights, in DEvELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 239, 244 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985).
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values held by the state's people and about the ways in which those values
might be embodied in their constitution.
This type of evaluation is a potentially far-reaching technique whose
possibilities David Schuman has illustrated:
The founders of a populist frontier state with a tradition of ferocious
individualism, like Washington or Oregon, probably intended to
carve out a larger sphere of rights, a larger arena of activity into
which the government could not intrude, at least with respect to such
matters as bearing arms and avoiding scrutiny, than a more
communitarian, homogeneous state like Massachusetts or one with
sectarian roots like Maryland. Those latter states, on the other hand,
might be assumed to have cared more deeply about matters of
religion. 19
As this passage makes clear, character-based arguments tailored to the
purportedly unique characters of individual states provide a potentially
powerful means for differentiating state constitutions from their national
counterpart and from each other.
This kind of character-based differentiation is more than a theoretical
possibility; it has already found favor among some state supreme courts.
Indeed, Schuman's account is consistent with one given by the Oregon
Supreme Court in the course of construing the Oregon Constitution. In an
opinion holding that the state constitution's protection of free speech
extends, unlike the First Amendment, to obscene expression, the court
observed: "Oregon's pioneers brought with them a diversity of highly
moral as well as irreverent views," and "most members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1857 were rugged and robust individuals
dedicated to founding a free society unfettered by the governmental
imposition of some people's views of morality on the free expression of
others."2I
In another well-known example, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
that the New York Constitution provides greater protections than does the
United States Constitution in numerous areas of free speech, including
reporters' privileges against disclosure of sources, 2' the application of
nuisance law to adult bookstores, ' and the application of libel law to the
19. David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report from the Provinces,
2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 275, 285 (1989).
20. State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 16 (Or. 1987).
21. See O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr. Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1988) (concluding that the
state constitution mandates a reporter's qualified privilge while noting that the Supreme Court has
declined to recognize such a privilege under the United States Constitution).
22. See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that
in determining whether state action affects freedom of expression under the state constitution, it is the
impact on the protected activity that is crucial and not the nature of the activity as the Supreme Court
held under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution).
1998] 1223
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expression of opinions.' According to the New York court, what justi-
fies these decisions is the fact that "New York has a long history and
tradition of fostering freedom of expression, often tolerating and supporting
works which in other States would be found offensive to the
community."24 In other words, New Yorkers are simply more tolerant
of eccentric, dissenting, or distasteful speech than are Americans generally,
and the state and national constitutions merely reflect the degree to which
each polity possesses this particular character trait.
Other courts have followed suit. The Texas Supreme Court, in yet
another free speech case, held that the Texas Constitution provides greater
protection than the federal Constitution against the issuance of gag orders
by trial courts.'5 The court argued that the Texas Constitution must be
understood to "'reflect Texas' values, customs, and traditions."'26 The
court supported its divergent reading of the Texas free speech provision by
reference to the different "experiences and philosophies" of the state's
founders, whose views were shaped by "years of rugged experience on the
frontier."' Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the rugged
Alaskan character, forged in a place that "has traditionally been the home
of people who prize their individuality," justifies a generous interpretation
of the state constitution's privacy rights.'
The propriety of turning to a distinctive state character as an aid to
interpreting a state constitution depends upon two critical assumptions.
First, state constitutions as a class of documents must be sufficiently like
the national Constitution to bear the weight of character-based argument.
This means primarily that, like the United States Constitution, they must
be capable of being understood as constitutive expressions of a set of
values held by the state polity. If state constitutions somehow differ from
the national Constitution in this respect, then it is unclear what justifies
23. See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277 (N.Y. 1991) (comparing the
.expansive language" of the state constitution with that of the First Amendment and recognizing the
state's tradition of providing the broadest possible protection).
24. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 494.
25. See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 7-10 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that the Texas
Constitution's affirmative grant of free speech rights offers more expansive protection than the federal
Constitution, which only prohibits government regulation of speech).
26. Id. at 16 (quoting LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986)).
27. Id. (quoting JAMES C. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS 41 (1987)).
28. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). For an enthusiastic endorsement of this
view, see Ronald L. Nelson's ominously titled article, Welcome to the "Last Frontier," Professor
Gardner: Alaska's Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REv.
1, 5-8 (1995) (contending that Alaska's Constitution reflects the state's physical, demographic, and
historical uniqueness). For a rather different picture of Alaska, see Carey Goldberg, Alaska Revels in
Frontier Image Though Frontier Slips Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (noting, for example,
that "fully half the population. . . now lives in metropolitan Anchorage, where in most ways they
might just as well be living in Minneapolis or Buffalo").
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attempting to construe them by this means. Second, the character of the
people of the state must be sufficiently different from that of the national
character to justify invoking the local character in lieu of the national one.
If the local character does not materially differ from the national one, then
resort to local character cannot influence the result and seems pointless.
These two assumptions are related, and I have previously expressed skepti-
cism about both of them.29 In this paper, however, I shall assume the
first in order to focus on the second-the proposition that the characters of
the various state polities differ so significantly from the national character
as to affect the content of state constitutional law.
It is easy to be skeptical of this hypothesis. All too often arguments
about the unique character and values of the people of a given state resem-
ble nothing so much as chamber-of-commerce-style boosterism. New
York's free speech jurisprudence again provides a good example. The
Court of Appeals claims for New Yorkers a history of tolerance exceeding
that of Americans generally, yet even a cursory review of the free speech
decisions of the United States Supreme Court reveals something quite diff-
erent: a long history of New York restrictions on speech. Indeed, some of
the Supreme Court's best-known free speech rulings came in cases in
which the Court reviewed speech-restrictive regulations from New York."
These decisions, particularly those invalidating New York restrictions on
speech, hardly bespeak a New York tradition of extraordinary attachment
to free speech, much less an attachment stronger than that of the nation.
Perhaps the court may have had in mind Times Square, with its laissez-
faire traditions of sexually explicit speech.3' Yet Times Square is hardly
29. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 812-30 (rebutting the idea that state constitutions express
fundamental political values by citing the mundane details and frequently changing nature of state con-
stitutions, and arguing that, even if the documents did embody such values, decreasing local distinctive-
ness makes differences between states' political values unlikely); James A. Gardner, What Is a State
Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1044-54 (1993) (viewing state constitutions not as the embodi-
ment of independent political values, but rather as safeguards that reinforce national political values
when the federal government fails to do so).
30. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a child pornography law);
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (invalidating a school board measure that allowed the
removal of books from school libraries); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating restrictions on advertising by public utilities); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969) (overturning a conviction under a New York law that made it a misdemeanor to
denounce the American flag); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding a law that
required a list of subversive organizations to be compiled for the purpose of disqualifying persons from
employment in public schools); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding actions taken
to silence a speaker whose speech caused the audience to become unruly, thereby threatening a breach
of the peace); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating an ordinance that granted wide
administrative discretion in the issuance of permits for public religious gatherings); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948) (invalidating an ordinance that forbade the public use of a sound amplifier without
a permit); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding the punishment of subversive
advocacy).
31. Some of the principal cases in which the Court of Appeals has identified and implemented New
York's speech-protective traditions involved sexually explicit materials. See, e.g., People ex rel.
1998] 1225
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representative of midtown Manhattan, much less New York City, down-
state New York, or the entire state. As two commentators have observed,
the court's invocation of New York's "'traditional' acceptance of the
bizarre and offensive [is] a dubious proposition that might well surprise the
residents of, say, Elmira [a small city in the western part of the state]."32
But it would be wrong to infer from implausible and badly crafted
arguments that persuasive, well-crafted ones are impossible. What I pro-
pose to do here is to focus on a case study that provides the best possible
conditions for testing the New Judicial Federalism's contentions about
character differentiation in state polities: the antebellum and Confederate
South. The Civil War era South makes a good example for two reasons.
First, the idea that the South is meaningfully different from the rest of the
nation is one that persists strongly to this day, and I take it that few who
hold this belief would be inclined to think that it was any less true before
and during the Civil War. Second, the Confederate South furnishes the
only example in American history of a region becoming so alienated from
the rest of the nation that it actually attempted to dissociate itself and
become a separate nation. If the South's secession in any way responded
to regional feelings of difference, surely those differences must have been
profound. Furthermore, the solution sought by the South was a complete
break at the constitutional level; Southerners thus considered their distinc-
tiveness to be of constitutional dimension.
As I understand them, advocates of the New Judicial Federalism
would interpret the events of this period as evidence of a distinctive
Southern character and set of values. These character differences even-
tually became sufficiently pronounced to contribute to the decision of
Southern states to secede. Although the political issue of secession was
settled by the Civil War, those same regional character differences persist
to this day. Accordingly, it would be appropriate today, and would have
been all the more appropriate between, say, 1830 and 1865, to interpret the
constitutions of Southern states in light of the distinctive aspects of
Southern character.
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986) (addressing a goverment-orderedshutdown
of an adult bookstore due to sexual acts on the premises); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556
(N.Y. 1986) (involving a seizure of obscene videocassettes). Interestingly, both of these cases arose
in the Buffalo area rather than in New York City. Moreover, even if it were once true that Times
Square reflected New York's tolerance of explicit sexuality and sexual speech, that tolerance appears
to have faded: in the newly redeveloped Times Square, some sex shops have been replaced by a Disney
store. See Frank Rich, Goodbye to All That, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at 27 (describing the advent
of a "de-sexed, partially Disneyfied 42d Street").
32. Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott & People v. Keta: "Democracy Begins in
Conversation", 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1279, 1350 (1993); see also Robert M. Piter, Independent State
Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 267-78 (1996) (expressing skepticism about the Court of
Appeals' elaboration of a unique New York tradition of tolerance).
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In the remainder of this paper I assess the plausibility of a character-
based interpretation of Southern constitutions. My conclusion, based on
a review of the writings of historians who study the South and of social
scientists and historians who study nationalism, as well as a comprehensive
review of Southern constitutions and judicial interpretations from the ante-
bellum and Confederate period, is that the character differentiation hypoth-
esis does not hold up. Although Southerners may differ in many respects
from the general run of Americans, these differences are not differences of
"character"-that is, they are not the kind of differences that would cause
Southerners to hold values significantly different from those of American
society generally. More importantly, any such differences do not rise to
a magnitude that is likely to be reflected in a state constitution.
Consequently, I conclude as a practical matter that any differences between
Southerners and other Americans have no significant ramifications for the
interpretation of Southern constitutions.
Part II begins by examining and refining the concept of state unique-
ness that underlies the contentions of the New Judicial Federalism. Part
III, after considering some of the hazards inherent in attempting to evaluate
cultural distinctiveness, responds to claims of Southern distinctiveness by
demonstrating a consensus among historians of the South on three related
points. First, historians overwhelmingly agree that Southerners are not and
have never been a people distinct from Northerners or other Americans.
Second, historians persuasively have shown that contemporary beliefs about
the existence of a distinctive Southern character far exceed the reality of
any differences that might distinguish the South from other regions. Third,
many of the strongest claims for Southern distinctiveness are either the fruit
of romantic mythologizing or remnants of self-conscious propaganda cam-
paigns waged largely by Southern elites to convince the Southern masses
of the justice of secession, the need to prosecute the ensuing war vigor-
ously, and the importance of reshaping the post-war Southern economy to
be more modem and competitive.
Part IV approaches the topic from an entirely different perspective.
Abandoning the historical approach in light of the possibility that the
historians might be wrong or that their analysis might somehow be irrel-
evant to the subject of constitutional character differences, Part IV focuses
on the Southern constitutions themselves for evidence of Southern distinc-
tiveness. Section A begins by setting out several reasons why any differ-
ences between the South and North, regardless of whether they can be
characterized as differences of character or values, are unlikely to be
reflected in constitutions. Section B then undertakes an exhaustive examin-
ation of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America and the
various constitutions of the Confederate states in force between 1776 and
1861, as well as the substantial body of judicial decisions interpreting
1998] 1227
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them. My conclusion is that none of these documents or judicial decisions
displays the slightest evidence of distinctive Southern character or values.
In fact, they tend to show the opposite: Southern courts and constitution
makers viewed their constitutions as separate but parallel instantiations of
a set of universal constitutional principles common to all American consti-
tutions and the received common law. Indeed, on a constitutional level
Southerners distinguished themselves from Northerners not by cloaking
themselves in a mantle of distinctiveness, but by casting themselves as the
legitimate heirs of the founding generation of Americans and by approp-
riating the symbols and ideology of the common American political culture.
Southerners, in other words, claimed that they were more authentic
Americans than Northerners.
Finally, Part V offers a partial explanation of these developments by
examining the nature of American nationalism. Unlike the nationalism that
has arisen in other nations, American nationalism focuses on political ideals
rather than geographic, ethnic, language, or religious commonalities.
Moreover, American nationalism has historically been based on a kind of
universalism that teaches the inclusiveness of American society and its
openness to all who accept American principles of liberty and equality.
These features of American nationalism made it especially difficult for
Southerners, who had absorbed these ideas for centuries and admired them
intensely, to make a decisive break with the United States. Part V con-
cludes with a brief sketch of an alternative account of the nature of
constitutional disagreement in the United States, one that sees such dis-
agreements as resulting from internal disputes over the content of a com-
mon constitutional tradition rather than external clashes between disparate
systems of character and values.
II. The Meaning of State Uniqueness
It is a basic tenet of the New Judicial Federalism that the character and
values of each American state polity are unique. Yet this critical proposi-
tion is typically advanced as though it were a self-evident truth. In an age
of instantaneous global communication, free mobility, concentrated national
media ownership, and rampant, homogenizing mallification, the existence
of significant state-to-state variation in character and values might well be
thought a proposition in need of some defense. In what sense, then, are
states unique, and how do we know?
Certainly, in the most basic sense, each state is unique if only in that
it occupies a uniquely defined physical territory. Is this enough to generate
a distinct set of local values of constitutional dimension? Some evidently
think so: two prominent state supreme court justices, for example, list
1228 [Vol. 76:1219
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"geography"33 and "land" '4 among the factors that must be taken into
account in the interpretation of their states' constitutions. The idea that
geography and climate influence national character is an old one in political
theory. According to Aristotle,
Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but
wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain
comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are
incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are
intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore
they are always in a state of subjection and slavery.35
A more modernly "scientific" account is given by Montesquieu:
Cold air constringes the extremities of the external fibres of the
body; this increases their elasticity, and favors the return of the
blood from the extreme parts to the heart . . . . On the contrary,
warm air relaxes and lengthens the extremes of the fibres; of course
it diminishes their force and elasticity.
People are, therefore, more vigorous in cold climates. Here the
action of the heart and the reaction of the extremities of the fibres
are better performed, the temperature of the humors is greater, the
blood moves more freely towards the heart, and reciprocally the
heart has more power. This superiority of strength must produce
various effects; for instance, a greater boldness, that is, more
courage; a greater sense of superiority, that is, less desire of
revenge; a greater opinion of security, that is, more frankness, less
suspicion, policy, and cunning .... The inhabitants of warm
countries are, like old men, timorous; the people in cold countries
are, like young men, brave.36
While these examples are absurd to modem sensibilities, they never-
theless point to the need to avoid the trap of essentialism into which these
thinkers fall. "Culture," Louis Wirth reminds us, "does not spring directly
or automatically from the soil or the atmosphere. It develops, rather,
through an intricate process . . . If any relations between natural habitat
and social and cultural characteristics exist . . . they must be shown to
exist in actuality. They cannot be assumed . . . ., Moreover, Wirth
adds, "civilizations as they mature tend to emancipate themselves from the
33. Kaye, supra note 16, at 19.
34. Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 965.
35. 2 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE VII.7.1327b24-.1327b29,
at 1986, 2107 (Bollingen Series No. 71, Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (Revised Oxford Translation).
36. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 221-22 (Franz Neumann ed. & Thomas
Nugent trans., Hafner Books 1949) (1748).
37. Louis Wirth, The Limitations of Regionalism, in REGIONALISM IN AMERICA 381, 388 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1951).
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soil and the natural context out of which and in which they developed. 38
To start, then, from an assumption of state uniqueness, whether on the
basis of climate or any other variable, is to risk a kind of platonism in
which state constitutions are conceived as imperfectly realized expressions
of some ideal state character that is known a priori rather than from the
evidence.39
It behooves us, then, to seek a better account of the New Judicial
Federalism beliefs in unique state character and in character's relevance to
state constitutional interpretation. The best explanation of this position, it
seems to me, would go something like this. We begin from the observa-
tion that the people of the states are Americans. It follows that American
38. Id. at 388. "The more persuasive suggestions," writes George Tindall in a model of
understatement, "have resulted from concentration upon human factors and causation" rather than
natural factors like climate and geography. George B. Tindall, Mythology:A New Frontier in Southern
History, in THE IDEA OF THE SOUTH: PURSUIT OF A CENTRAL THEME 1, 11 (Frank E. Vandiver ed.,
1964).
39. Boyd Shafer argues that there is no such thing as a "constant or ever-present national
character," and to attribute some general national character to the climate or geography is "nonsense."
BOYD C. SHAFER, NATIONALISM: MYTH AND REALITY 228-29 (1955). He continues:
The Germans ... are supposed to have a disciplined, military character-exactly the
opposite of that they were supposed to possess during the early Napoleonic period. The
French are thought of today as logical, cultivated. . . , pacifist lovers of freedom; exactly
the opposite of what most Europeans considered them during the latter part of the
Napoleonic era....
[This error is made by bad history, as well as] by contemporary two-week tourists
and society editors temporarily turned foreign correspondents who set out to confirm all
their prejudices and to footnote with their profound platitudes all the horrible peculiarities
everyone already, of course, knows about without having investigated.
Id. at 230. Richard White makes a related point in his discussion of contemporary rejection of the
essentialism of past generations of historians of the American West:
New Western Historians, by and large, do not seek essentialism. They do not
search for the master traits and master factors of western history. They still assert that
the West is a distinct region, but they define that distinctiveness in a fundamentally
different way. They have . . . a relational outlook on the West. Now they certainly
recognize distinctive attributes of the physical West-aridity, the only high mountains in
the continental United States, vast tracts of largely unoccupied land, a general lack of
navigable rivers. But . . . they do not see these environmental factors as translating
automatically into a distinctive, essentialist western culture. How could they? Each
successive group of immigrants has not confronted pure nature; they have confronted
worlds created by people who came before them and in many cases continued to live
alongside them. What made the West distinctive was not some direct communication of
its life force, but rather a series of relationships established with that place which
inevitably changed over time.
Richard White, Trashing the Trails, in TRAILS: TOWARD A NEW WESTERN HISTORY 26, 36 (Patricia
Nelson Limerick et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter TRAILS].
A very different approach is taken by Benedict Anderson, who argues that nations, regardless
of their actual features, are "imagined communities," and that the existence of administrative subdivi-
sions has historically provided a focal point for the imagination of a nation coterminous with the admin-
istrative boundaries. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 53-65, 163-64, 184-85 (rev. ed. 1991).
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character and values must normally be taken to define the outer parameters
of the character and values state polities might possess. This is the case
not only because all state citizens are formally Americans due to the consti-
tutional structure of federalism, but also, because of an extensive shared
history and a set of shared beliefs and aspirations, the evidence for which
lies in the obvious present success and cohesiveness of the nation.
Cohesiveness, however, need not imply uniformity, especially in a
nation of such great size. Consequently, it is possible in theory for the
people of a state to occupy any point within the defining parameters of
American character and values. Furthermore, it is likely, and perhaps
inevitable, that different state polities will occupy different points within
the range, if only as a result of an uneven distribution of concededly
American characteristics across the nation.' It is also likely that some
state polities will be the sole occupants of some points within the relevant
range. This, then, is what is meant by state "uniqueness"-not that state
polities might possess characters and values that are unique in the context
of all possible human character and values, but that states might occupy
points along a spectrum of American character traits and values that are
occupied by no other formal political grouping of Americans.
On the assumption that a state constitution reflects the character and
values of the state polity, a preliminary task for state constitutional
interpreters would be to determine where within the range of American
character and values the polity of a particular state falls. This question can
be answered in part by considering the ways in which the state polity dif-
fers from the American norm. These differences may be illuminated by
the state's history, culture, politics, and so forth-that is, through
examination of the factors that might be thought to influence a polity's
character and values.
This account raises an important question, which may be framed both
theoretically and practically. As a theoretical matter, one might ask: what
is the available range of variation within the parameters that define the
boundaries of American character and values? Is the American character
so narrowly defined that deviations from the norm quickly entail conflicts
with American values? Or is Americanness a concept sufficiently flexible
to accommodate a contextually meaningful range of characters and values?
This is a question that has greatly exercised the country at various times.
For example, during the McCarthy era, the nation publicly debated whether
it was possible to be simultaneously a Communist and an American. My
main concern, however, is not with the theoretical extent of Americanness,
and I shall simply assume a flexible definition of American character.
Instead, I want to focus on the practical formulation of the question: is the
40. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 830-32.
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actual, observable variation among the states of a sufficient magnitude to
be reflected meaningfully in state constitutions? In other words, do the
character and values of any state polity differ from the American mean to
such an extent that the meaning of the state constitution can be significantly
illuminated by examination of those differences? This is the question to
which examination of the antebellum South may provide a partial answer.
The South's differences from the rest of the nation not only reached their
peak during that period,4" but attained a magnitude that, in the view of
Southerners themselves, actually placed the South outside the boundaries
of American values, at least insofar as those values were embodied by the
North. Thus, the antebellum and Confederate South provide the histori-
cally limiting case against which the extent of variation in the values and
character of Americans may be judged.
III. The Nature of Southern Distinctiveness
A. The Elusiveness of Distinctiveness and the Question Posed
Surely no claim about the extent of Southern distinctiveness exceeds
that made by Frank Owsley in the 1930 Southern Agrarian manifesto I'll
Take My Stand. Even as the United States was being founded, the North
and South, according to Owsley, were not merely different in their eco-
nomic or social structures-they were "two civilizations."4I "The two
sections," he argued,
clashed at every point. Their economic systems and interests
conflicted. Their social systems were hostile; their political
philosophies growing out of their economic and social systems were
as impossible to reconcile as it is to cause two particles of matter to
occupy the same space at the same time; and their philosophies of
life, growing out of the whole situation in each section, were as two
elements in deadly combat. What was food for the one was poison
for the other.43
The authors of 1'll Take My Stand did not intend it to be entirely
objective-their intention, on the contrary, was to produce a polemical,
partisan, and deliberately provocative piece of propaganda to convince
41. According to Carl N. Degler, secession was "the high point of southern distinctiveness."
CARL N. DEGLER, PLACE OVER TIME: THE CONTINUITY OF SOUTHERN DISTINCTIVENESS 1 (1977).
Clement Eaton argues that the entire period from 1820-1860 deserves that description. See CLEMENT
EATON, THE MIND OF THE OLD SOUTH 241-42 (1964) (summarizing the unique Southern characteris-
tics of intolerance, extreihe conservatism, and an exaggerated sense of honor that emerged from a study
of fifteen Southern men living from 1820 to 1860).
42. Frank Lawrence Owsley, The Irrepressible Conflict, in I'LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH
AND THE AGRARIAN TRADITION 61, 72 (Harper Torchbook 1962) (1930) [hereinafter I'LL TAKE MY
STAND].
43. Id. at 90-91.
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Southerners to live a certain kind of life and to pursue a political program
to secure it. Nevertheless, Owsley's broadside has reverberated through
the decades and stands as a benchmark against which other claims of
Southern distinctiveness may be judged.
Almost no other historian, even in Owsley's day, has suggested that
the South's distinctiveness approaches the magnitude Owsley claimed, and
there are indications that Owsley himself may not quite have believed it."4
Yet historians and social scientists who study the South uniformly agree
that the South is distinct in some way, to some degree. Take, for example,
the elaborate myths of the Old South, which no one has described better
than W.J. Cash. In the legend of the Old South, Cash writes,
gesturing gentlemen move soft-spokenly against a background of rose
gardens and dueling grounds, through always gallant deeds, and
lovely ladies, in farthingales, never for a moment lost that exquisite
remoteness which has been the dream of all men and the possession
of none. Its social pattern was manorial, its civilization that of the
Cavalier, its ruling class an aristocracy coextensive with the planter
group-men often entitled to quarter the royal arms of St. George
and St. Andrew on their shields, and in every case descended from
the old gentlefolk who for many centuries had made up the ruling
classes of Europe.
They dwelt in large and stately mansions, preferably white and
with columns and Grecian entablature. Their estates were feudal
baronies, their slaves quite too numerous ever to be counted, and
their social life a thing of Old World splendor and delicacy.45
Yet even an unabashed Southern sentimentalist like Cash, who insists on
the reality of Southern distinctiveness, readily concedes that this account
is mythical, a kind of "stage piece out of the eighteenth century. "' At
the same time, even a militantly unsentimental writer like Howard Zinn,
who expresses the most skeptical conclusions about the scope of Southern
distinctiveness, concedes not just the power but in important ways the
reality of many of the stock myths and stereotypes about the South-that
it is, for example, racist, violent, evangelical, and xenophobic. Far from
denying the truth of these descriptions of the South, Zinn merely disputes
the contention that such traits are distinctively Southern.47
44. See the biographical sketch by Virginia Rock appended to the 1962 paperback edition of I'LL
TAKE MY STAND, supra note 42, at 360, 374-75 (noting that Owsley admitted some of his essays were
"deliberately provocative").
45. W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH at xlix (vintage 1991) (1941).
46. Id.
47. See HOWARD ZINN, THE SOUTHERN MYSTIQUE 217-19 (1964) (contending that although many
view them as distinctly regional, the Southern traits of racism, violence, and conformity are actually
just more visible manifestations of traits that are endemic to the entire American character).
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Yet the truth of the standard accounts of Southern distinctiveness may
well be beside the point. As David Potter has observed, nationalist move-
ments like Southern secessionism typically attempt to draw on cultural
commonalities, but "if these cultural elements do not exist in reality, the
nationalist movement may fabricate them."' This tactic can sometimes
create out of a spurious distinctiveness a genuine one: "If the members of
a population are sufficiently persuaded that they have cause to be a unified
group, the conviction itself may unify them, and thus may produce the
nationalism which it appears to reflect." 49 Thus, perceptions of difference
may arise from many kinds of distinctiveness or, perhaps, from none. And
clearly such perceptions exist: sociologist John Shelton Reed has found that
Southerners have a rate of group identification exceeding that of Roman
Catholics and union members and approaching that of blacks and Jews."
All this is to say that attempting to assess the South's distinctiveness
can be hazardous. "The quality of distinctiveness," C. Vann Woodward
warns, "is notoriously elusive."'" It is easily manipulated for partisan
52purposes. Historians frequently disagree among themselves over the
content and significance of Southern distinctiveness. Even one as deeply
committed to Southern distinctiveness as Francis B. Simkins has conceded
that "Soutfiernism is a reality too elusive to be explained in objective
terms. It is something like a song or an emotion, more easily felt than
recorded. '
At this point, one may be tempted to ask: If regional distinctiveness
is like a song, if it is too elusive to be objectively explained, what business
have courts invoking it as a ground for constitutional decisionmaking? And
what business have scholars of New Judicial Federalism urging them to do
so? Yet the nature of regional distinctiveness may not be so elusive as to
render it useless to the task of state constitutional interpretation. Much
depends upon the question that is asked, and on this point constitutional
lawyers may well be able to provide some assistance to historians instead
of the other way around.
The question of difference arises often in the law, particularly in the
area of equal protection. Constitutional lawyers have understood for some
48. DAVID M. POTTER, THE SOUTH AND THE SECTIONAL CONFLICT 51 (1968).
49. Id. at 53.
50. See JOHN SHELTON REED, ONE SOUTH: AN ETHNIC APPROACH TO REGIONAL CULTURE 21,
80 (1982).
51. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY at ix (rev. ed. 1960).
52. See PAUL M. GASTON, THE NEW SOUTH CREED: A STUDY IN SOUTHERN MYTHMAKING 5,
217-46 (1970) (noting that the symbolic term "'New South' may stand for whateverkind of society that
adopters of the term believe will serve the region's interests best or promote their own ambitions most
effectively").
53. Francis Butler Simkins, The South, in REGIONALISM IN AMERICA 147, 149 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1951).
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time that to speak abstractly of differences and similarities is meaningless.
Any two things are alike or different in an infinite number of ways.
Consequently, what counts is not whether things are different but whether
they are different for some particular purpose. Differences, in other
words, must be relevant to the purpose for which they are invoked if they
are to be counted as significant.'M
This concept helps to narrow the question. There can be no question
of the South's distinctiveness for many purposes. Certainly, the South is
different from the North for purposes of deciding what crops to grow and
when to plant and harvest them; for purposes of ordering in a restaurant;
for purposes of deciding whether to say "yes, sir" or "yes, ma'am" to
your parents; and for countless other social purposes. Historians,
however, do not address Southern distinctiveness abstractly, but for pur-
poses of historical inquiry-for example, to evaluate forces of historical
causation. Thus, historians might inquire into Southern culture not to
determine whether it differed in any way from Northern culture-no one
seriously disputes this-but to determine whether the differences between
the two cultures were sufficient to have contributed to the South's decision
to secede. It is significant in this regard, as will soon appear, that the
more narrowly the question is framed, the less likely historians are to view
the South's cultural distinctiveness as historically meaningful.
The question posed here, then, is a relatively narrow one: was
Southern distinctiveness, as it existed during the antebellum and
Confederate periods, meaningful for the purpose of interpreting the consti-
tutions of Southern states?
B. The Extent of Southern Distinctiveness
1. The Shared American Experience.-Just how different was the
South? Was it, as Owsley claimed, a distinct "civilization"?55 Was it,
in Howard Zinn's provocative description, "a sport, a freak, an inexplic-
able variant from the national norm ... [whose] apartness goes deeper
than the visible elements of soil and sun and large black populations, into
the innermost values of the region"?56 Few think so. "[I]t is incorrect,"
John McCardell bluntly asserts, "to think of Northerners and Southerners
in 1860 as two distinct peoples." ' As William Taylor observes in his
54. A good account of this approach appears in Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REv. 537, 543-45 (1982) (clarifying that the relevant alikeness for the equal treatment
formula "starts with a normative determination that two people are alike in a morally significant
respect," which is established by defined categories).
55. Owsley, supra note 42, at 72.
56. ZINN, supra note 47, at 217.
57. JOHN MCCARDELL, THE IDEA OF A SOUTHERN NATION 1830-1860, at 3 (1979).
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influential study of the myth of the Southern Cavalier, "[w]hile there is a
certain basis to the belief that the North and South were distinctly different
during the antebellum period, few historians would any longer contend for
the idea of a divided culture as this idea was formerly advanced." 58
Southern culture, David Potter argues, was "distinctive" in many ways, but
"this [was] not the same as separateness."59 Efforts to show "that the
South had a wholly separate culture, self-consciously asserting itself as a
cultural counterpart of political nationalism, have led, on the whole,"
Potter asserts, "to paltry results. " 6° In sum, says C. Vann Woodward,
"[t]he South was American a long time before it was Southern in any self-
conscious or distinctive way. It remains more American by far than
anything else, and has all along. "61 That the broadest claims for Southern
distinctiveness should be undermined by the South's basic Americanness
seems unsurprising-Southerners had far too much in common with other
Americans to grow so far apart so quickly.
If it is true that experience is "the influence of first importance" in the
creation of "group or national character," 62 then the extensive shared
58. WILLIAM R. TAYLOR, CAVALIER AND YANKEE: THE OLD SOUTH AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
CHARACTER 16 (1979). Even a committed Southernist like Simkins concedes that the South did not
achieve full sectional consciousness until after the war. See FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS, THE
EVERLASTING SOUTH at xii-xiii (1963).
59. POTTER, supra note 48, at 68 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 68-69.
61. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 25. According to Charles Sellers, "the most important fact
about the Southerner is that he has been throughout his history also an American." Charles Grier
Sellers, Jr., Introduction to THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN at vi (Charles Grier Sellers, Jr. ed., E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1966) (1960).
62. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at ix. In American historiography, this notion was perhaps most
forcefully and influentially advanced by Turner, who argued that the frontier experience decisively
shaped the American character. See generally FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (Robert E. Krieger Publ'g Co. 1976) (1920). Turner's enormous influence on
contemporary thinking about the variability and development of culture in the American states is
obvious in the work of political scientists like Daniel Elazar and his followers such as John Kincaid.
See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, CITIES OF THE PRAIRIE 3-4 (1970) (analyzing the political culture of
small cities of the prairie regions as resulting from American settlement patterns); DANIEL J, ELAZAR,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 96-104 (1966) (purporting to identify three
distinct political cultures in the United States that exist in specifically identifiable geographic areas
resulting from patterns of westward migration); John Kincaid, Political Culture and the Quality of
Urban Life, in POLITICAL CULTURE, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE AMERICAN STATES 121-22 (John Kincaid
ed., 1982) (purporting to test Elazar's hypothesis by examining the nexus between Elazar's cultural
classification of American metropolitan areas and the quantitative "quality of life" measure for those
areas). Indeed, Turner's residual influence on these political scientists may well be stronger than it is
among historians, many of whom consider Turner's thesis to have been, at the least, greatly overstated.
See Ray Allen Billington, Foreword to FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN
HISTORY at xvi-xviii (1976) (surveying historians' criticisms of Turner's frontier thesis through the
1960s); William Cronon et al., Becoming West: Toward a New Meaning for Western History, in UNDER
AN OPEN SKY: RETHINKING AMERICA'S WESTERN PAST 3, 3-4 (Cronen et al. eds., 1992); William
Cronon, Turner's First Stand: The Significance of Significance in American History, in WRITING
WESTERN HISTORY: ESSAYS ON MAJOR WESTERN HISTORIANS 73, 90-91 (Richard W. Etulain ed.,
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experiences of the South and North during the Revolutionary and ante-
bellum periods argue strongly against the broadest claims of Southern
distinctiveness. Socially, William Taylor writes, the South "experienced
in some measure all of the historical forces which were fast changing the
face of society in the North."'63 These included the move toward white
manhood suffrage, the breaking up of families and kinship groups as a
result of frontier settlement, the enthusiasm for capitalism of the Jacksonian
period, and a religious awakening. 4 Economically, the North and South
traded with each other extensively, forming a system of mutual economic
interdependence.65
Politically, the South was a key participant in many of the most signif-
icant political events of the young United States.' The South furnished
material and moral support to the North during the British blockade of
Boston and attack at Lexington.67 It provided the major leaders of the
founding period such as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. Like the
North, it took pride in the accomplishments of the Revolution and joined
in the nation's apotheosis of Washington. It supplied ten of the first
twelve presidents-men who held power for more than fifty of the nation's
first sixty years-and twenty-three of the first thirty-six Speakers of the
House of Representatives .69 Its influence in Congress was sufficiently
great to cause Northerners and Westerners to complain about the South's
excessive power.7' And it "collaborated in the founding of the two major
parties which ruled the country until the fifties."' Far from going its
separate way, the South was so involved in American history during this
1991) (listing many of the criticisms of Turner's frontier thesis); William G. Robbins, Laying Seige to
Western History: The Emergence of New Paradigms, in TRAILS, supra note 39, at 184.
63. TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 16.
64. See id. at 16-17.
65. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 9-10 (1976) (discussing the
antebellum economic system in which the South produced exports, the Northwest supplied foodstuffs
for the South and Eastern cities, and New England and the Middle States developed most of the manu-
facturing and commerce).
66. See DEGLER, supra note 41, at 32 (describing the South's participation in various reform
movements and in the development of public higher education).
67. See John W. Blassingame, American Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the Southern
Colonies, 1763-1775, 34 J.S. HIsT. 50, 63-64 (1968).
68. See POTTER, supra note 65, at 12-13.
69. See PETER APPLEBOME, DIXIE RISING: How THE SOUTH IS SHAPING AMERICAN VALUES,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 12 (1996) (stating that slaveholding Southerners served as president for 49
of the nation's first 72 years). Before 1861, the South also supplied 24 Presidents Pro Tern of the
Senate and 20 of 35 Supreme Court Justices. See id. at 12-13.
70. See AVERY 0. CRAVEN, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM, 1848-1861, at 27-35
(1953) (describing the growing partisan and regional tensions over the expansion of slavery, as related
to the annexation of Texas, the Mexican War, and the Oregon territory).
71. TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 17.
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period that Southern and American political history become difficult to
distinguish.'
Nowhere is the basic similarity of the Southern and American outlook
more starkly revealed than in the realm of Southern ideology. As antago-
nisms between North and South grew, Southern political theorists attempted
to develop an ideology that would unify the South and provide a justifica-
tion, should one prove necessary, for secession. 3 These writers, includ-
ing most prominently George Fitzhugh, tried to build a distinctively
Southern ideology, one that demonstrated not only the justice but also the
superiority of Southern institutions, including slavery. Yet they were
unable to escape in any significant measure the basic impulses of their
American liberal heritage.
Working from images of the South as more traditional, more aristo-
cratic, and more hierarchical than the rest of America, Southern theorists
attempted to build a political ideology drawing on Burkean traditionalism
and the European body of antiliberal thought that sprung up in the wake of
the French Revolution. These Southern efforts to develop an organically
Southern political ideology have been neatly skewered, with evident glee,
by Louis Hartz. "When we penetrate beneath the feudal and reactionary
surface of Southern thought," Hartz writes, "we do not find feudalism: we
find slavery."74  Southerners, he contends, "exchanged a fraudulent
liberalism for an even more fraudulent feudalism: they stopped being
imperfect Lockes and became grossly imperfect Maistres."75
The inconsistencies to which Southern theorists were driven, says
Hartz, are painful to observe.76 To defend slavery, for example, Southern
thinkers found themselves turning against Jeffersonian notions of liberal
equality. They tried instead to defend slavery on the grounds of
traditionalism, but: "Shouldn't the Southerners, by their own reasoning, be
clinging to Jefferson rather than trying to destroy him? Shouldn't they in
fact be denouncing themselves?"' America, Hartz observes, had laid a
72. "Most of all," writes Richard Beringer and his colleagues, "these Americans, North and
South, shared history." RICHARD E. BERINGER ET AL., WHY THE SOUTH LOST THE CIVIL WAR 75
(1986).
73. See generally DREW GILPIN FAUST, THE CREATION OF CONFEDERATE NATIONALISM:
IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY IN THE CIVIL WAR SOUTH (1988).
74. LouIs HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 147 (1955).
75. Id. at 148. William Wiecek makes a similar point. "[T]he South's antebellum
constitutionalism," he writes, "was discriminating and opportunistic"; that is, it favored state power
on some issues but strong federal power on others when necessary to effectively defend slavery.
Southern constitutionalism was thus "a theory neither of rights nor of sovereignty but of power."
William M. Wiecek, "Old Times There Are Not Forgotten": The Distinctiveness of the Southern
Constitutional Experience, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF
THE SOUTH 159, 169 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989).
76. See HARTZ, supra note 74, at 148.
77. Id. at 151.
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trap: by establishing liberal equality as a national birthright, "it had
transformed the rationalist doctrine of Locke into the traditionalist reality
of Burke, so that anyone who dared to use conservatism in order to refute
liberalism would discover instead that he had merely refuted himself."7"
"Few political theorists," Hartz continues, "save possibly in a nightmare
dream, have ever found themselves in a predicament quite as bad as
this. "7 9
Carl Degler has made a similar observation about the South's proslav-
ery ideologies. On its face, nothing seems more contrary to traditional
American aspirations toward liberal egalitarianism than the doctrine,
promulgated in the South particularly near the inception and following the
outbreak of hostilities, of black racial inferiority. In fact, Degler points
out, the South's proslavery arguments show only "how close in values the
South was"' to the rest of the nation:
For only if the South had not found it necessary to defend slavery on
grounds of [the inferiority of the black] race would it have shown
itself to have a different value system from the North. The reason
the other slave societies of the New World did not find it necessary
to arrive at a racial defense of slavery is that they saw no
fundamental contradiction between slavery and the social order. In
those slave societies slavery was only one of several forms of
subordination, albeit a severe one. In the United States, on the other
hand, with its historic emphasis on equality and freedom, slavery was
an anomaly.8'
Because slavery conflicted with the ideals of the Declaration of
Independence and the American history of political democracy, in the
American context of equality, slavery could be defended only on the
ground that some persons were not truly men. As a consequence, America
became the only slave society in which race became an important defense
of slavery.'
2. Southern Internal Diversity.-If the proponents of Southern
distinctiveness have at times underacknowledged the similarities that bind
Americans North and South, they have at other times overstated the
South's internal unity and social cohesion.' Both kinds of errors tend to
78. Id.
79. Id. at 153.
80. DEGLER, supra note 41, at 89.
81. Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
82. See id. Another account of the inconsistency of slaveholding with liberal principles can be
found in Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., The Travail of Slavery, in THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN, supra
note 61, at 40-71.
83. Even the use of the terms "North" and "South," Edward Pessen has noted, tends to presup-
pose the existence of the very differences historical inquiry is designed to examine. See Edward
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limit the value of generalizations regarding Southern character, Southern
values, and Southern distinctiveness. To gloss over the South's internal
diversity is to construct "a monolithic South, a region without internal
differences, a people without diversity-a South, in sum, that never
was."84
As Emory Thomas has noted, the seceding states were hardly a unity:
"Topographically the section varied from the swamps of Louisiana to the
mountains of western Virginia; culturally Southerners included such diverse
peoples as Creoles, European immigrants, mountaineers, the first families
of Virginia, and Texas frontiersmen. "I Cotton was grown principally in
the states of the Lower South and tobacco in the states of the Upper
South.86 Plantation culture, associated with the cultivation of cotton,
accordingly was far more influential in the Lower South. Attitudes toward
slavery also differed somewhat in the two regions, in consequence perhaps
of the more complete dependence of cotton production on slave labor, or
of the more overt capitalism of the parvenu Gulf state cotton magnates as
compared with the more restrained and self-consciously aristocratic aspira-
tions of the established Virginia tobacco planters.' To the extent, then,
that Southern distinctiveness is traced to climate, particular modes of agri-
cultural organization, plantation culture, or the qualities of slaveholding
society,8 8 any assertion of Southern distinctiveness must be qualified to
Pessen, How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North and South?, 85 AM. HIST. REV.
1119, 1119 (1980).
84. DEGLER, supra note 41, at 7.
85. EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION: 1861-1865, at 34 (1979).
86. See CHARLES S. SYDNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM, 1819-1848, at
14 (1948).
87. See CRAVEN, supra note 70, at 13-16 (contrasting the tendency of the Lower South to disfavor
change with the Upper South's gravitation toward the industrialization of the North); CLEMENT EATON,
THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN CIVILIZATION 1790-1860, at 1-48 (1961) (discussing the social characteris-
tics existing at different times and in different regions of the South); SYDNER, supra note 86, at 7-8
(noting that raising tobacco did not require large numbers of slaves).
88. See, e.g., JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY, 1789-1861: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT at 7-8 (1930) ("The roots of Southern unity are grounded in the laws
of nature; for soil, climate, and topography had created a South of agriculture as opposed to a North
of manufacturing and commerce .... "); CRAVEN, supra note 70, at 2-3 (arguing that industrialism
threatened the Southern way of life); EATON, supra note 87, at 297, 298 (maintaining that the planter
class preserved English traditions of noblesse oblige and personal honor and that slavery unified
Southerners); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE: TWO ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETATION 118-19 (1969) (positing that the institution of slavery organized Southern thought and
culture so as to produce a distinctive world view); ROLLIN G. OSTERWEIS, ROMANTICISM AND
NATIONALISM IN THE OLD SOUTH 11 (1949) (stating that climate and the plantation system created
conditions receptive to particular aspects of European romanticism); SYDNER, supra note 86, at 31
(claiming that the whole South was unified by being primarily agricultural); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 15 (1977) ("The slavery
controversy was the most important single influence on American constitutional development before
the Civil War."); Simkins, supra note 53, at 148 (giving a similar account of the impact of climate and
soil).
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reflect the South's diversity in these respects. Although it may not be
entirely true that "[t]he distance from Charleston to Birmingham is in some
respect measurable only in sidereal terms," 9 it may well be the case, as
Clement Eaton has remarked, that the subregions of the South constituted
"a federalism of cultures. "9
While some divisions within the South were associated strongly with
specific regions, others were less geographically confined. Among the lat-
ter were divisions of class. Many of the attributes that are sometimes said
to mark Southern distinctiveness-gracious plantation life, elaborate man-
ners, and aristocratic leanings, for example-were found, if at all, primar-
ily in the lives of members of the planter class. Yet this was a social class
whose interests, as Eugene Genovese has shown, were unique among
Southerners. 9' It is this group that had the most to lose from the abolition
of slavery and that most vigorously supported active resistance, and it is
also this group that in its customs and way of life most differed from
Northerners and other Americans. 92
Farther down in the Southern social order, life among the middle and
lower classes was considerably more likely to resemble its Northern
counterparts both in the characteristic outlooks of class members and in
their views on Southern secession. The commercial life of merchants, for
example, tends to be similar from place to place, and it should come as no
surprise that the Southern mercantile classes, whose livelihoods depended
to some extent on the levels of economic activity available within a strong
union, opposed secession until resistance became essentially pointless.93
Among ordinary farmers, who did not own slaves and were unlikely to
spend much time sipping mint juleps on the veranda, differences with the
North were likewise less pronounced: "The resemblances between the
Southern yeomanry and the small farmers and villagers of the North were
much greater than their differences. 94
89. CASH, supra note 45, at viii.
90. EATON, supra note 41, at 24.
91. See GENOVESE, supra note 88, at 120-22 (describing the tensions between the slave-holding
class and the bourgeoisie). A study of the planters' shifting loyalties and economic interests sheds
interesting light on their motivations. See generally Lawrence N. Powell & Michael S. Wayne, Self-
Interest and the Decline of Confederate Nationalism, in THE OLD SOUTH IN THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR
29 (James J. Cook & Harry P. Owens eds., 1983).
92. See EATON, supra note 41, at 222-23 ("It is to the aristocracy... of the South that one must
look for the most marked differences between the North and the South."); EATON, supra note 87, at
297 ("In 1860 the South was differentiated from the North more by the character of its upper class than
by the distinguishing qualities of its great middle class, the yeoman farmers.").
93. See EATON, supra note 41, at 60-62.
94. Id. at 113. Eaton, however, contends that by 1860 agreement on a set of basic, defining tenets
of Southern life cut across social classes. See id. at 241-42 (listing several regional mores that differen-
tiated the South from the North just prior to the Civil War).
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Nor was the South monolithically united politically. Secession itself,
for example, did not occur as the result of a deliberate, unified act of
Southern states mutually recognizing some common destiny. While the
states of the Lower South-South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas-voted to secede shortly after Lincoln's
election,9' the Upper South was in no comparable rush.' Secession
movements were beaten back in North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee,
Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware-all slave states,
and all places where "not only states but many individuals were painfully
divided in their sympathies."' Indeed, the standoff in the Upper South
might have lasted even longer had not President Lincoln forced the issue
by requisitioning troops from every state remaining in the Union to defend
the United States, following the attack on Fort Sumter. Compelled to
choose between competing loyalties, the states of the Upper South reluc-
tantly joined the seceding Southern states.9"
Finally, even after all the states of the Confederacy had seceded and
founded what they believed would be a new nation, the South was far from
united behind the military defense of secession. Perhaps the most vivid
manifestation of this internal division was the campaign of outright resis-
tance to the Confederacy, carried on in some cases by military means, by
unionists in numerous areas of the South. Thus, as the South was waging
full-scale war against the Union, it also faced pockets of internal rebellion
in northern Alabama, eastern Tennessee, western North Carolina, northern
Georgia, and northwest Arkansas. 99 In eastern Tennessee, for example,
an organized campaign of sabotage by unionists required the Confederate
government to send an occupation force of 11,000 troops.l°°
3. Individual Southern Traits.-The great majority of historians who
study the South seem to agree that the two-culture hypothesis, especially
in view of the South's internal diversity, represents an unhelpful overgener-
alization. Most seem inclined, therefore, to treat the South's
95. It is by no means clear that public opinion even in the Lower South was united in favor of
secession. Voting on secession in these states was characterized by turnout lower than in the immedi-
ately preceding presidential election, and the voting results revealed a significant division of public
opinion. See PAUL D. ESCOrr, AFTER SECESSION: JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE FAILURE OF
CONFEDERATE NATIONALISM 25-26 (1978).
96. This account draws primarily on CRAVEN, supra note 70, at 349-90; and POTrER, supra note
65, at 491-554 (both describing the wave of Lower Southern states' secession after South Carolina's
lead, followed by hesitant actions by Upper Southern states).
97. POTTER, supra note 65, at 548.
98. See ESCORT, supra note 95, at 41-44 (describing the events that eventually led the Upper
Southern states to secede).
99. See DEGLER, supra note 41, at 103.
100. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE IMPERILED UNION: ESSAYS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE
CIVIL WAR 265 (1980).
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distinctiveness as a phenomenon of some complexity, constituted by
numerous social, demographic, and economic factors. Yet beyond
agreeing on a framework of complexity, historians seem to agree on little
else; for every historian who identifies some factor as contributing to
Southern distinctiveness, there is another historian waiting in the wings to
argue that the factor in question has played no significant role.
One factor sometimes mentioned as setting apart the antebellum South
is its ethnic homogeneity. Emory Thomas, for example, claims that
"[c]ompared with other Americans, white Southerners were a homogeneous
people ethnically and culturally."' 0 ' Carl Degler points to the reluctance
of new immigrants to settle in the South, which he attributes to a lack of
economic opportunity and the aristocratic character of Southern life, some-
thing that may have reminded many immigrants too strongly of the
European societies they consciously chose to abandon."° John Shelton
Reed goes so far as to propose that "[m]any of what are seen as regional
differences in the United States may simply be disguised and diffused
ethnic differences.""03 Yet at the same time Kenneth Stampp contends
that the South's white population "came from the same stocks as the
northern population," 4 and David Potter argues that "[e]thnically,
America has probably never shown a greater degree of sameness than at
the time when the nation was dividing and moving toward civil war. " "
Even if the factual assertions of all these historians could be reconciled,
which may well be possible,"° it is nevertheless clear that they differ
fundamentally on the question of the impact of the South's ethnic makeup
on its distinctive character, or indeed on whether the South was meaning-
fully distinct in this regard at all.
Another frequently mentioned aspect of Southern distinctiveness is the
agrarian character of Southern life. The Southern Agrarians, of course,
placed the agrarian life at the heart of Southernism,'" but other
historians without so obvious an ideological axe to grind have also pointed
to the agrarian lifestyle as distinguishing the South. Carl Degler, for
101. THOMAS, supra note 85, at 9.
102. See DEGLER, supra note 41, at 46-47.
103. REED, supra note 50, at 25.
104. STAMPP, supra note 100, at 255.
105. POTTER, supra note 65, at 8.
106. To givejust one example, Sydner reports census figures showing that in 1820 there were just
over 12,000 unnaturalized aliens in the South as compared with over 41,000 in the North. See
SYDNER, supra note 86, at 3. The North was thus home to nearly four times as many recent immi-
grants as the South. On the other hand, the South's white population in 1820 was about 2.7 million,
and the North's was about 5.4 million. Id. This means that recent immigrants comprised less than one
percent of the population of either region. These figures might thus be taken to show both that the
South was more homogeneous than the North and that both regions were extremely homogeneous.
107. See Owsley, supra note 42, at 72-76 (contrasting the agrarian South with the industrial
North).
1998] 1243
Texas Law Review
instance, notes that the South was the most agricultural region of the nation
and contained the fewest cities, 108 while Avery Craven claims that the
prevalence of rural agriculture in the South made closeness to the soil a
stamp of Southern life. i9
On the other hand, Thomas Govan observes that the various agricul-
tural occupations found in the South, and their accompanying outlooks,
were found throughout the states." 0 David Potter also argues against a
juxtaposition of Southern "planter" and Northern "industrial" cultures:
"the common conditions of life of plain farmers throughout an
overwhelmingly rural republic," he claims, "completely transcended these
distinctions. Dirt farmers, South and North, were the backbone of both
sections, planter aristocrats and rising industrialists notwithstanding.""'
Indeed, says Potter, most Americans during the antebellum period were
"farmer folk who cultivated their own land and cherished a fierce devotion
to the principles of personal independence and social equalitarianism."" '
North and South alike, Americans were proud of their revolutionary heri-
tage, scorned Europe, practiced a "somewhat intolerant, orthodox
Protestantism," and professed faith in "rural virtues, and a commitment to
the gospel of hard work, acquisition, and success."" 3
A third factor sometimes mentioned as characteristic of Southern
distinctiveness is the South's penchant for violence. The case for the
violent Southerner has been made most strongly by Frank Vandiver.
Southerners, Vandiver explains, have been portrayed as
arrogant, cheroot-puffing planters, sipping juleps; power-sodden,
leisure-ridden fops, watching in slack-jawed pleasure the beating of
a slave; dirt-grubbing sharecroppers, hating their debts to the country
store; anonymous amalgams of men, faceless and pale behind their
108. See DEGLER, supra note 41, at 14. But see Pessen, supra note 83, at 1133 (arguing that
although the South lagged behind the North in urban development, its cities were growing rapidly
during the antebellum years and qualitatively resembled Northern cities).
109. See CRAVEN, supra note 70, at 9, 11.
110. See Thomas P. Govan, Americans Below the Potomac, in THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN,
supra note 61, at 19, 21.
111. PoTrER, supra note 48, at 73-74; see also BERINGER ET AL., supra note 72, at 81 (expressing
doubt about whether "the average Georgia plowman sensed a distinct nationality from the average Ohio
plowman, even after the war began"); Pessen, supra note 83, at 1122 (asserting that "Northerners and
Southerners alike made their living primarily in agriculture," although specializing in "different
crops").
112. POTTER, supra note 65, at 472. Again, census figures support both sides of the agrarianism
question. In 1820, for example, 90% of employed Southerners were engaged in agriculture as
compared with 77% elsewhere in the nation. See SYDNER, supra note 86, at 5. Thus, it is true both
that the South was more agricultural than the North in 1820 and that both regions were overwhelmingly
agricultural. Id. at 5-6.
113. POTER, supra note 48, at 73-74. The American pastoral mythology of agrarian life is com-
prehensively critiqued in RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 23-
59 (1955).
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sheets, burning crosses, lynching fellow men; money-worshipping
scalawags, grasping the trough of the Great Barbecue; gross
politicos, bellowing racist catechisms with Bilbo-like fervor;
indignant men of liberal stripe, . . . fighting lonely, dirty battles;
masses with hate-contorted faces, screaming at television cameras,
frothing on schoolyards in Little Rock, New Orleans, Oxford." f4
But one trait, according to Vandiver, "brands them all: violence..."5 He
goes on to relate this trait to a particular way of responding to challenge
which he calls the "offensive-defense mechanism." '' 16 Other historians
make a similar point: Emory Thomas, for example, contends simply that
violence was more socially acceptable in the South than elsewhere."7
Again, though, these contentions do not go undisputed. Howard Zinn, for
instance, while conceding the prevalence of violence in the South, argues
that it was a trait that was far from distinctively Southern. The West,
claims Zinn, was just as violent, but the object of the violence was Indians
rather than blacks."' "Puritans," Zinn adds, "killed Indians as savagely
as did Virginians," and the two most important revolts in early American
history, Shay's Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion, were Northern
phenomena." 9
The South, then, if these historians are to be believed, was ethnically
homogeneous, but not uniquely so. It was rural and agrarian, but not
uniquely so. It was violent and evangelical, but not uniquely so. It was
individualistic and xenophobic, but not uniquely so. It was racist, but far,
far from uniquely so. 20 This pattern causes Howard Zinn to reject
Southern distinctiveness in principle:
the South, . . . far from being utterly different, is really the essence
of the nation. It is not a mutation born by some accident into the
normal, lovely American family; it has simply taken the national
genes and done the most with them. It contains, in concentrated and
dangerous form, a set of characteristics which mark the country as
a whole. It is different because it is a distillation of those traits
114. Frank E. Vandiver, The Southerner as Ertremist, in THE IDEA OF THE SOUTH: PURSUIT OF
A CENTRAL THEME 43, 43 (Frank E. Vandiver ed., 1964).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 46.
117. See THOMAS, supra note 85, at 20.
118. See ZINN, supra note 47, at 239.
119. Id. In a mid-1970s survey, 75% of white Southerners agreed with a statement that "guns
should be registered like cars, with a requirement that owners be tested in order to be able to use one."
JACK BASS & WALTER DEVRIES, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SOCIAL CHANGE
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE SINCE 1945, at 17 (1977).
120. Historians seem exceptionally unified in their belief that racism has always been an American
problem rather than a uniquely Southern one. See, e.g., POTTER, supra note 48, at 75; THOMAS, supra
note 85, at 11; ZINN, supra note 47, at 219-38.
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which are the worst (and a few which are the best) in the national
character. Those very qualities long attributed to the South as
special possessions are, in truth, American qualities, and the nation
reacts emotionally to the South precisely because it subconsciously
recognizes itself there. 12
4. Reducibility to Slavery.-Zirm's solution to the puzzle of Southern
distinctiveness is neat and pleasingly paradoxical, but there is another,
more straightforward solution that has proven attractive to many historians.
According to this account, many-perhaps most-of the complex, vague,
and disputed aspects of Southern distinctiveness may be traced to a single
factor in which the South was obviously and indisputably distinct: its
practice of slavery.
On this view, slavery is implicated in the production of Southern
distinctiveness in two ways, one proceeding organically from within
Southern life and the other proceeding more artificially from a combination
of external and internal factors. The internal account has been well articu-
lated by David Potter. According to Potter, theories of Southern distinc-
tiveness tend to stress either economics, culture, or values.In But, says
Potter, the differences between a slaveholding and non-slaveholding society
could be reflected in all three: slavery posed an ethical question that precip-
itated a "sharp conflict of values"; it was a "vast economic
interest";2 a and it was "basic to the cultural divergence of North and
South, because it was inextricably fused into the key elements of southern
life-the staple crop and plantation system, the social and political ascen-
dancy of the planter class, [and] the authoritarian system of social
control."'" Slavery, Potter concludes, had an impact on cultural and
economic matters unmatched by any other sectional factor. 26 A similar
analysis leads Carl Degler to argue that the acceptance of slavery not only
put the South on the road to secession, but also set it on the course to its
modern distinctiveness. 27 Slavery, he argues, made the South biracial,
shaped its economic and demographic patterns and its society, and created
a culture in which free whites lived together with black slaves .128 Even
the Southern fondness for religions favoring biblical literalism, Degler
121. ZINN, supra note 47, at 218 (emphasis in original). For a similar argument see GRADY
MCWHINEY, SOUTHERNERS AND OTHER AMERICANS (1973) (arguing that writers have blown societal
differences out of proportion and ignored the fundamental patterns of social history).
122. See POTTER, supra note 65, at 41 (noting that "cultural, economic, and ideological" formulas
have long been used to explain the sectional conflict).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 42.
125. Id. at 42.
126. See id. at 43.
127. See DEGLER, supra note 41, at 42-43.
128. See id. at 45-46.
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claims, can be traced in part to the Southern defense of slavery. That is,
only interpretive forms of biblical exegesis like those favored by abolition-
ists could produce a reading of the Bible that prohibited slavery. 29
The external account of the role of slavery in forging Southern
distinctiveness, in contrast, takes no position on the extent to which slavery
might have produced a distinctive set of customs and beliefs. According
to the external account, slavery's role in shaping Southern society, even if
minimal in fact, was enormously and decisively magnified by the South's
reaction to Northern attacks on slavery. Avery Craven, for example,
argues that Southerners were at first far from united about the merits of
slavery. 3' Nevertheless, many outside the South began to treat
Southerners as unified around the question of slavery and as having mono-
lithic interests and beliefs: "A symbol of Southern values-political, social,
and economic-had been created. The force inherent in a great
humanitarian, democratic crusade was now added to normal sectional
rivalries, and the equally powerful force inherent in the defense of an
accepted social order was drawn about Southern positions. " "' Out of
indifference and division, Craven contends, came unity, along with the per-
ception of "[a] fight for equality and the preservation of a way of
life."' 32 With this Potter agrees: slavery, he writes, gave "false clarity
and simplicity to sectional diversities which were otherwise qualified and
diffuse. One might say that the issue structured and polarized many
random, unoriented points of conflict on which sectional interests
diverged." 33 The South's mistake, C. Vann Woodward notes wistfully,
was that it "allowed its whole cause, its way of life, its traditional values,
and its valid claims in numerous nonmoral disputes with the North to be
identified with one institution-and that an institution of which the South
itself had furnished some of the most intelligent critics. "134
129. See id. at 61. An even more robust version of the internal account is offered by Bertelson,
who argues that the differing degree to which slavery took root in the South and the North itself reflects
antecedent differences between Southerners and Northerners in their attitudes toward work, which can
be traced to different patterns in the earliest settlement of the American colonies. See DAVID
BERTELSON, THE LAZY SOUTH 244-45 (1967). For a cogent response, see C. Vann Woodward, The
Southern Ethic in a Puritan World, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 343 (1968).
130. See CRAVEN, supra note 70, at 17-19.
131. Id. at 19.
132. Id. at 20, 19-20.
133. POTTER, supra note 65, at 43; see also MCCARDELL, supra note 57, at 3-4, 85 (arguing that
slavery "came to represent for Southerners a whole ideological configuration-a plantation economy,
a style of life, and a pattern of race relations-which made Southerners believe that they constituted a
separate nation" and that by the 1850s "more and more Southerners came to rest their advocacy of a
Southern nation upon the preservation of slavery and the preservation of slavery upon the doctrine of
white supremacy and enhancement at the Negro's expense").
134. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 180-81. Potter adds that the conditions dictated by the
presence of slavery "became the criteria for determining what constituted the South." POTTER, supra
note 65, at 451.
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Compounding this error, Southerners, Woodward continues, "set about to
celebrate, glorify, and render all but sacrosanct with praise the very institu-
tion that was under attack and that was responsible for the isolation and
insecurity of the South."135
Southerners, then, according to these accounts, were not ultimately
distinct from Northerners in their culture, values, or fundamental beliefs.
They were, at bottom, Americans-Americans who practiced slavery.
What we think of as Southern distinctiveness, then, may be in some sense
what happens to Americans. when they are placed in and their interests
aligned with those of a slaveholding society.136 To treat the differences
between Northerners and Southerners as manifestations of underlying fun-
damental differences of character, on this view, misinterprets the evidence:
it attributes different behaviors to different underlying characters rather
than to different circumstances capable of eliciting correspondingly differ-
ent behaviors from a single, consistent underlying character. It is, in other
words, a bit like attributing a person's growing crabbiness during the late
fall and winter to a change of character and values when the only thing that
has changed is the weather. If this view is correct, then the various ele-
ments of Southern distinctiveness are reducible, more or less, to the prac-
tice of slavery, and any apparent differences between the North and South
in values or beliefs must be recast as superficial rather than deeply or
organically held.
It is possible, however, to view the matter differently. Exactly where
external circumstances leave off and internal character begins is notoriously
a matter of interpretation. Whether one is inclined to view a hungry man
who steals a loaf of bread as a good man driven by circumstance to do an
evil deed or an evil man acting consistently with his character-a Jean
Valjean or a Fagin-depends greatly on one's views about individuals'
capacity for self-determination. It may be perfectly true that Southerners
were Americans who practiced slavery, but it does not necessarily follow
that their character and values as slaveholders, particularly after many
generations, may not with some justice be deemed internalized, organic,
135. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 182.
136. V.O. Key makes a similar point about the post-slavery South. Writing in 1949, Key found
the South to have a distinctive style of politics associated with a one-party system. See V.O. KEY, JR.,
SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 8-11 (1949). Yet "the major peculiarities of southern
politics," he claimed, "go back to the Negro." Id. at 5. Indeed, Key wrote,
[i]t must be conceded that there is one, and only one, real basis for southern unity: the
Negro. . . . The maintenance of southern Democratic solidarity has depended
fundamentally on a willingness to subordinate to the race question all great social and
economic issues that tend to divide people into opposing parties.
Id. at 315-16. Other "nonracial bonds of unity" exist, but they "differ little from those factors that lend
political cohesion, for example, to the wheat states or to the corn belt," which do not practice the kind
of politics that distinguishes the South. Id. at 665.
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and different from the character and values of Americans living in nonslave
societies.
This is the perspective adopted by Eugene Genovese in his Marxian
account of Southern society. According to Genovese, slavery gave rise in
the South to a "special psychology" manifested in the creation of a slave-
holding class with interests and tendencies antithetical to those of urban,
bourgeois capitalism.'37 The social and political structure of slavery,
Genovese argues, forged slaveholders into "a ruling class of a distinct type
and with a special character." 3 ' In creating for themselves this world
of privilege and power, slaveholders came to possess a distinctive "world
view"; 39 slavery, Genovese contends, created "a body of sensibilities,
a way of judging human relationships, [and] a notion of social order.""
Those who lived this life, then, held a fully internalized set of values and
possessed character traits that differed from those found elsewhere in the
nation.
There is no easy way to adjudicate between these different accounts
of the impact of slavery on Southern life. In his response to Genovese,
however, Carl Degler in effect proposes a test.' 4 ' If the observable dif-
ferences between the antebellum North and South are attributable princi-
pally to superficial effects of slavery, then we would expect the post-war
elimination of slavery in the South to eliminate most of these differences
and to permit the underlying American values of Southerners quickly to
reassert themselves. 42 If, on the other hand, Southern differences run
deep in the form of a distinctive, fully internalized world view, then we
would expect such views to persist for some considerable time following
the war's end and to make sectional reconciliation difficult. In the view of
Degler and many others, the speed and ease with which the South rejoined
the Union suggest strongly that slavery "had not resulted in a novel world
view."143
5. Ease of Reintegration.-One of the striking facts about the Civil
War is the alacrity with which the South capitulated following Appomattox.
Unlike many other nationalisms that have survived decades, and in some
cases centuries, of "occupation, partition and repression," "the myth of
137. GENOVESE, supra note 88, at 3, 26.
138. Id. at 118.
139. Id. at 127.
140. Id. at 244.
141. See DEGLER, supra note 41, at 106-08 (emphasizing the small impact that emancipation had
on the South).
142. See id. at 107 (arguing that the ease with which Southerners accepted emancipation implies
that the South had not constructed an ideology around slavery).
143. Id. at 107.
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Southern nationalism," in the words of Kenneth Stampp, "died remarkably
soon."'" Many historians see in this phenomenon evidence that beliefs
about Southern distinctiveness never took deep roots in the South and that
most Southerners on some level realized that their differences with the
North were simply not of a magnitude sufficient to justify their departure
from what was, at bottom, their own nation.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, Southern intellectuals and propagan-
dists promoted secession by spreading the message of the South's
distinctiveness, yet they were frustrated by their lack of success among the
general populace. According to David Potter, antebellum Southern writers
who proclaimed the need for a distinctive southern literature failed for lack
of readers.' s  Despite attempts to liberate Southern education from
Northern textbooks, curricula, and teachers, "Southern education continued
to be American education." 1" Furthermore, notes Potter, "the advocates
of a Southern culture spent much of their time complaining that the South
would not accept their cultural program."147
Kenneth Stampp concludes bluntly from this evidence that "the notion
of a distinct southern culture was largely a figment of the romantic
imaginations of a handful of intellectuals and proslavery
propagandists.' The South, he argues, was even after four years of
intense conflict still bound to the Union by "a heritage of national ideals
and traditions."' 49 As a result, the South's military defeat did not rep-
resent the overthrowing of a distinct culture or society. On the contrary,
"[d]efeat restored to Southerners their traditions, their long-held
aspirations, and, as part of the federal Union, the only national identity
they ever had." 5 ' Thomas Govan makes a similar point: the South, he
writes, "re-accepted membership in the national society with little or no
144. STAMPP, supra note 100, at 259-60. Stampp compares the myth of Southern nationalism to
the reality of Polish nationalism. Id. Recent history provides other examples of ingrained nationalisms.
Vietnamese nationalism survived decades of occupation and war against the French and Americans.
More recently, the breakup of the Soviet Union has shown the degree to which the nationalist senti-
ments of many peoples were suppressed by, and have survived, Soviet dominance.
145. See POTrER, supra note 48, at 69.
146. Id.
147. Id. McCardell likewise contends that "calls for a distinct Southern literature degenerated into
increasingly shrill announcements of sectional superiority," MCCARDELL, supra note 57, at 143, that
"Southerners continued to subscribe to Northern periodicals and patronize Northern authors while
neglecting their own sectional publications," id. at 157, and that "the most strident calls for 'Southern
education' were completely lacking in substance." Id. at 205.
148. STAMPP, supra note 100, at 256; see also BERINGER ET AL., supra note 72, at 76 (claiming
that Confederate nationalism was "the movement of an intellectual elite, exercising a generous amount
of wishful thinking").
149. STAMPP, supra note 100, at 256.
150. Id. at 259.
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change in basic attitudes and beliefs, because none was required. Its return
to the nation was not an abandonment of its ancient tradition, but a return
to it .... ,151
Even slavery, Carl Degler argues, was never "firmly integrated into
[Southerners'] value structure"-they abandoned it too quickly and were
"simply too much a part of the bourgeois world to accept slavery
wholeheartedly . ... ,n Furthermore, Degler observes, "emancipation
was not accompanied by the kind of emotional resistance that a challenge
to deeply held values can be expected to call forth."153 He finds a signif-
icant contrast in the South's strong and united resistance to Reconstruction
programs that threatened to end white supremacy." Once Southerners
saw that they did not need slavery to maintain their social and economic
superiority over blacks, they were willing to relinquish it without further
ado.55 But when Reconstruction began to interfere with their ability to
maintain that relationship of superiority through other means, they engaged
in "a prolonged period of guerilla warfare. 1 56  To these historians, then,
the ease with which the South returned to the Union shows that it had
never strayed too far.
151. Govan, supra note 110, at 38-39. James McPherson has criticized this position as mistakenly
associating the Confederate defeat with a lack of will rather than a loss of will. See James M.
McPherson, American Victory, American Defeat, in WHY THE CONFEDERACY LOST 15, 34-35 (Gabor
S. Boritt ed., 1992). In a recent study of the correspondence of Civil War soldiers, McPherson con-
cludes that feelings of Southern nationalism were a significant motivation for those who fought, espe-
cially among those who enlisted early in the war. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT
FOR, 1861-1865, at 9-25 (1994). McPherson's evidence, though, provides little support for his
conclusions. First, his sample, as he readily concedes, overrepresents those who would be likely to
express nationalist sentiments-officers drawn from slaveholding families, for example. Second, even
apart from this methodological difficulty, the absence of a deeply rooted Southern nationalism is hardly
inconsistent with enthusiastic professions of nationalistic feeling at the outset of hostilities. A more
relevant test would seem to be the extent to which such sentiments continued to be expressed even after
prolonged conflict, including setbacks. Here, McPherson acknowledges an eventual erosion in patriotic
enthusiasm, id. at 24-25, corresponding to a loss of will to continue the war. McPherson, supra, at
34-35. His study, then, does little to undermine the conclusions of historians who believe that Southern
nationalism faded so quickly precisely because it was weakly established.
Another recent dissenting voice is that of Gary W. Gallagher. Gallagher disputes the "prevalent
scholarly image" that the South's defeat is attributable to the weakness of its nationalism. See GARY
W. GALLAGHER, THE CONFEDERATE WAR 5 (1997). According to Gallagher, "[sitrong feelings of
national identity helped spawn the impressive will Confederates exhibited during their war for
independence." Id. at 63. Scholars, he contends, confuse acceptance of defeat with absence of
Confederate identity. Id. at 71. In support of his contentions, Gallagher quotes expressions of loyalty
from many Southern sources. Id. at 73-111. Gallagher's evidence, however, is subject to a criticism
much like the one he levels at his opponents: he confuses popular support for the troops, and the obe-
dience of the troops to official authority, with nationalistic sentiment.
152. DEGLER, supra note 41, at 107.
153. Id. at 108.
154. See id. (noting the fierce resistance to Reconstruction).
155. See id. at 109-10 (describing the means that southern whites used to control blacks once
slavery was abolished).
156. Id. at 109.
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6. Mythmaking and Propaganda.-For all their many disagreements,
historians seem virtually united in their belief that Southerners "had created
a myth of difference that went beyond the facts of difference." 57 What
strikes numerous historians as significant about this divergence is the way
it came about: through what was in many cases a deliberate propaganda
campaign aimed at hardening Southern attitudes against the North. To the
extent that contemporary beliefs about Southern distinctiveness are merely
artifacts of a program of politically motivated mythologizing, those beliefs
must, of course, be viewed with a certain skepticism.
According to John Hope Franklin, Southern historiography as a disci-
pline was for many years guilty of dedicating itself to the creation of a
myth of Southern cohesiveness for political purposes. Franklin claims that
the long-discredited Cavalier thesis, 5 ' for example, was "propagated by
politicians, literary men, and publicists, against the opposition of Virginia's
abler historians, for it arose not from new historical knowledge, but from
the exigencies of the mounting sectional controversy."' 59  By the late
1840s and 1850s, Franklin argues, Southern historians were deliberately
writing history "that asserted the South's difference from and superiority
to the North."1"'
Not all Southern myths necessarily arose from calculated sectional
politics. According to William Taylor, for example, the two main periods
of mythmaking in literary fiction about the South were approximately 1832
to 1855 and 1880 to 1900,161 periods in which the political benefits of
promoting Southern distinctiveness seem uncertain. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that the image of the South that we have inherited, and the idea of
Southern distinctiveness itself, results at least in part from deliberate
campaigns of political propaganda waged by Southern political and cultural
elites for the purpose of solidifying Southern support for secession and
war.
Southerners went to great lengths in the period immediately preceding
the Civil War to create a distinct Southern identity. According to Drew
157. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
158. According to this thesis, differences between the North and South could be traced to different
patterns of colonial settlement following the English Civil War. The South, in this view, was settled
primarily by loyalists (Cavaliers) and the North by the crown's opponents (Roundheads). See TAYLOR,
supra note 58, at 15-16.
159. John Hope Franklin, "As For Our History ... ", in SELLERS, supra note 61, at 3, 5 (citing
WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, THE LEGEND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 109-12 (1956)).
160. Id. According to John Blassingame, the people we now describe as Southerners lacked any
self-conscious regional identity before the American Revolution. Blassingame, supra note 67, at 59;
see also MCCARDELL, supra note 57, at 13 (noting that there is no evidence of feelings of distinct
regional communities in the colonies). William Taylor adds that Southern sectional consciousness was
generally unknown to members of the founding generation. See TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 333.
161. See TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 148. A study of Southern literature more specifically devoted
to its use of history is F. GARVIN DAVENPORT, JR., THE MYTH OF SOUTHERN HISTORY: HISTORICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTHERN LITERATURE (1970).
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Gilpin Faust, some Southerners, under the influence of nineteenth century
European theories of nationalism stressing unities of race, language, and
religion," portrayed Northerners as Saxons and Southerners as Normans
to give Southern identity a racial or ethnic basis. 63 Some Southern intel-
lectuals even began a movement to lead Southern speech toward a restora-
tion of what was conceived to be its original English purity as a way to
distinguish it from Northern speech, which was characterized as
degraded."'6
Religion, too, was invoked to provide a framework for Southern
nationalism. Southerners, Faust writes, considered themselves the "most
godly of Americans."165 While this created some understandable tension
with the need for war, Southern clergy worked to justify the war in reli-
gious terms: "[T]he Confederacy's claim to divine sanction extended
beyond the question of the war's origins or immediate political purposes
to an examination-and reevaluation-of the southern social and moral
order in light of God's commands. The purpose of the war ... was not
simply to achieve independence, but to defend the moral right of survival
for the South's peculiar civilization.""6 Northerners, it was claimed, had
fallen from the divinely sanctioned path of the American Revolution. This
made "God himself into a nationalist and made war for political
independence into a crusade." 167 The Confederacy, in this view, became
the new Israel, and "[t]he reciprocity between God and his chosen thus
obligated southerners as a group. "161
Paul Escott, in his study of Jefferson Davis, also shows how political
leaders could deliberately cultivate a sense of difference. Throughout
1861, Davis attempted to whip up support for the Confederacy by casting
the Confederacy as "the true embodiment of American principles of gov-
ernment. Rather than destroying the American system, the formation of
the Confederacy preserved and vindicated it. The Confederacy had become
the guardian of the founders' legacy." 69  Yet by 1862, in response to
increasingly shrill attacks on the central Confederate government by
member states, Davis abruptly changed his message. Instead of casting the
South as heir to American values, Davis focused on what he characterized
as the North's barbarity. 7  "[C]lose identification of Confederate
162. For a general overview of such theories see HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 330-31
(1944); LOUIS L. SNYDER, THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM 14-27 (1968).
163. See FAUST, supra note 73, at 10-11.
164. See id. at 11.
165. Id. at 22.
166. Id. at 26.
167. Id. at 28.
168. Id. at 29.
169. ESCOT-r, supra note 95, at 40.
170. See id. at 179-80.
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purposes with the traditions and ideals of the United States," writes Escott,
had lost its political usefulness: "For if the ties between the North and the
South seemed too clear, people were likely to ask whether the high cost of
the war was necessary."171  Before the war, Southerners "had viewed
their fellow citizens in the North as part of a common nation, and this
image remained strong."'" To keep Southern morale high, Davis tried
to change the South's image of the North. 3 The task of Southern
nationalism, according to Escott,
was to accelerate the divergence between the image of the
confederacy and that of the United States and to create a separate and
distinct image of the South as opposed to the North. Southern
nationalists had to convince their fellows that in some way the South
was the negation of northern qualities and that no commonality could
overcome the differences between them. 174
Davis's attack on Northern perfidy "helped tear down the long-established
nexus between southerners' images of themselves and of their fellow
citizens in the North" and helped convince Southerners "that they were a
separate people." 75
The deliberate creation of Southern mythology did not cease with the
end of the Civil War. In his study of the mythology of the New South,
Paul Gaston shows how the end of the war merely bifurcated Southern
mythmaking into a romanticization of the Old South and a pragmatic cre-
ation of a mythical New South. On the one hand, Southerners in their
defeat "expressed reverence for the civilization that had existed in the
South, but conceded that it had passed irrevocably into history, had become
an 'Old South' that must now be superseded by a new order." 76 This
gave them a certain freedom of imagination which, combined with
despondency over defeat, "called forth a collection of romantic pictures of
the Old South and a cult of the Lost Cause that fused in the Southerner's
imagination to give him an uncommonly pleasing conception of his region's
past.""7 On the other hand, Southern leaders continued to drum up pub-
lic support for a variety of projects such as economic modernization,
171. Id. at 180.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 180.
174. Id. at 181.
175. Id. For discussions of counter-mythologizingby two of the North's great advocates of union,
Abraham Lincoln and Walt Whitman, see GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG (1992), and DAVID
S. REYNOLDS, WALT WHITMAN'S AMERICA: A CULTURAL BIOGRAPHY (1996).
176. GASTON, supra note 52, at 4.
177. Id. at 6; see also JAMES C. COBB, INDUSTRIALIZATIONAND SOUTHERN SOCIETY, 1877-1984,
at 13-14 (1984) ("[T]he glorification of the Old South was at least in part a psychological device,
designed to help humiliated southerners hold their heads up as they accepted much-needed investment
capital from their Yankee conquerors.").
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industrialization, and the achievement of economic self-sufficiency"7 '
through the creation of images of a New South, images that stood increas-
ingly in opposition to the fast-receding era of the Old South. 17 9
7. The Distinctiveness of Southern Experience.-The reason for
historians' warnings about the elusive quality of Southern distinctiveness
should now be clear. The broadest claims for Southern cultural separate-
ness founder on the strength of the Americanness shared by Southerners
and Northerners, their many common experiences, and the internal diver-
sity of Southern life. A wide variety of factors sometimes singled out as
contributing to Southern distinctiveness are shown to be either not unique
to the South, or less than decisive influences on Southern life, or both.
Moreover, to the extent that these factors are traceable to the South's
practice of slavery, their ability to capture continuing dimensions of
Southern distinctiveness is diminished. Finally, a combination of Southern
propagandizing and its apparent failure to take root or to impede the pro-
cess of reintegrating the South into the Union after the war suggests that
the extent of Southern distinctiveness is not only less than is often claimed,
but also was understood to be less by Southerners who lived in the period
in question. The nature of Southern distinctiveness, it seems, has slipped
through our fingers.
In recognition of this phenomenon, C. Vann Woodward has offered
a far more modest theory of Southern distinctiveness, which has influenced
many historians. Is Southern identity, Woodward wonders, meaningful any
more?"s° Social and economic changes across the South, he muses, "may
end eventually by erasing the very consciousness of a distinctive tradition
along with the will to sustain it."' The South has often been identified
by its shortcomings, Woodward notes, but even its faults "are
increasingly the faults of other parts of the country, standard American
faults."" s  Southerners, he claims, are "haunted" by "[t]he threat of
becoming 'indistinguishable.""'
178. See GASTON, supra note 52, at 23-79 (describing the programs proposed by various Southern
leaders to revive Southern prosperity).
179. See id. at 153-60 (discussing the tension between the proponents of the New South
movement, who espoused economic progress in the form of industrialization, and the spokesmen for
the Old South, who accused the New South of abandoning the Southern heritage).
180. See WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 3.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id. at S. For an elaborate cataloguing of the way the South and other American regions are
coming to resemble each other, and a critique of what they are jointly becoming, see JOHN EGERTON,
THE AMERICANIZATION OF DIXIE: THE SOUTHERNIZATION OF AMERICA (1974).
183. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 8. In a recent book, Peter Applebome argues that regional
homogenization has occurred more as a result of the South's emerging social dominance than the other
way around. Now, Applebome claims, it is not just the South but the nation that is
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Nevertheless, Woodward contends, there is one area in which the
South is meaningfully and permanently distinct from the rest of America:
its collective experience. The hard facts of this experience include the
South's long history of poverty in a nation of plenty; its history of
"frustration, failure and defeat" rather than success; and its history of guilt
in a nation of perpetual innocence.' 84 As a result, says Woodward,
Southerners do not easily share some typically American ideas such as "the
doctrine of human perfectibility"185  and a corresponding,
characteristically Northern, optimism. The South, he concludes, has
remained "basically pessimistic in its social outlook and its moral
philosophy. "16
With Woodward's thesis we have come a long way indeed from the
provocative contentions of Frank Owsley. Where Owsley thunders about
distinct and incompatible Southern and Northern civilizations, Woodward
bitterly antigovernment and fiercely individualistic, where race is a constant subtext to
daily life, and God and guns run through public discourse like an electric current[;]...
where influential scholars market theories of white supremacy, where the word "liberal"
is a, negative epithet, where hang-'em-high law-and-order justice centered on the death
penalty and throw-away-the-key sentencing are politically all but unstoppable[;] ...
obsessed with states' rights, as if it were the 1850s all over again and the Civil War had
never been fought ....
APPLEBOME, supra note 69, at 8.
Bass and DeVries also find Southern distinctiveness eroding in the political arena. In V.0. Key,
Jr.'s classic study of Southern politics, Key found that the exclusion of blacks and the one-party system
were the hallmarks of a distinctive regional form of political organization. KEY, supra note 136, at
665. In a follow-up study undertaken 25 years later, Bass and DeVries found that blacks had entered
the mainstream of political participation and that the Republican party had mounted a successful chal-
lenge to one-party Democratic dominance. BASS & DEVRIES, supra note 119, at 3-4. Their survey
data further showed that "differences between the South and non-South are fading-the effect of such
forces as network television, migration patterns, and urbanization-and that racial differences within
the region were greater than any differences between southern whites and nonsoutherners." Id. at 16.
Cobb challenges this view, at least as applied to the results of Southern industrial development.
Proponents of Southern industrialization, Cobb notes, expected that economic prosperity would give
rise in the South to "the same affluent progressive, egalitarian, socially conscious society" that existed
in the North. COBB, supra note 177, at 143. However, due to development patterns that impeded the
rise of an urban middle class, Southern economic development occurred on a very different pattern,
one free from many of the conditions of the Northern economy such as unions, high wages, and pro-
gressive corporate policies. Id. it 145-59. This result, says Cobb, "challenged the assumption that
all enlightened Americans shared a set of values and preferences typically associated with the lifestyles
of the northern urban bourgeoisie .... [I]ndustrialization has not obliterated the socioeconomic and
structural differences that have traditionally represented the fundamental basis of southern
distinctiveness." Id. at 162-63.
184. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 17-21.
185. Id. at 21.
186. Id. In a more recent work, Woodward acknowledged some weaknesses in his thesis relating
mainly to the South's lack of response to its distinctive experience. The South, he writes, has not
learned from these experiences, nor has it failed to embrace wholeheartedly the standard American
myths and beliefs. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THINKING BACK: THE PERILS OF WRITING HISTORY
116 (1986).
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quietly muses about a vague sense of pessimism growing out of a history
of military defeat and economic frustration. Woodward's thesis, moreover,
makes no claims about the nature or distinctiveness of Southern identity
before the Civil War.
The historians' analysis of Southern distinctiveness, if it is correct,
takes us to a point that confronts proponents of the New Judicial
Federalism with a difficult question: If the differences between North and
South during the antebellum and Confederate periods can be measured only
in the subtlest shadings, to what degree can regional distinctiveness really
serve as the basis for distinguishing the constitutions of Southern states
from those of states in other regions and from the Constitution of the
United States? Are the differences that historians of the South have
identified strong enough and discrete enough upon which to build an
approach to state constitutional interpretation? Certainly, there are ample
grounds for skepticism.
On the other hand, perhaps the historical account I have set out here
is wrong; perhaps it relies on the wrong historians, or misapplies their
work, or overlooks important facts. Or perhaps the historical account,
having been prepared by historians for historiographical purposes rather
than by lawyers for legal purposes, is simply irrelevant to the question of
state character as it is manifest in constitutions.
In either case, it is clear that an examination of the historical record
cannot provide a conclusive test of the distinctive state character hypothesis
for purposes of constitutional interpretation. In the following Part, I take
the next step by examining the constitution of the Confederate States of
America, the constitutions of the various antebellum Southern states, and
their official interpretations, for signs of the kinds of Southern distinctive-
ness previously discussed. I conclude that there is no evidence that
Southern distinctiveness, to whatever degree it might have existed, played
any appreciable role in the formulation or interpretation of these
constitutions.
IV. The Irrelevance of Southern Distinctiveness for Constitutional
Interpretation
A. Constraints on Character-Based Constitutional Variations
Before we turn to the Southern constitutions themselves for evidence
of Southern distinctiveness, it is worthwhile to note certain aspects of
American constitutionalism that, in general, reduce the likelihood that any
state's constitution will differ excessively from the American norm, regard-
less of the distinctiveness of the state's culture or values.
First, to write a constitution at all and to adopt it by popular ratifica-
tion is, generally speaking, to manifest a belief in a certain set of political
1998) 1257
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principles central to American political thought and practice. These
principles, derived largely from Enlightenment political philosophers such
as Locke and Sidney,"s include not only the doctrine of popular sover-
eignty but also a substantial set of accompanying philosophical baggage.
For example, most versions of popular sovereignty are undergirded by the
belief that individuals are fundamentally equal, that humans have a capacity
for rational thought adequate to give meaningful consent to social and
governmental arrangements, and so on.' 8 Consequently, it is unlikely
that an American-style constitution would reflect a substantially different
set of views, because a polity holding substantially different political beliefs
would be unlikely to implement them by way of an American-style
constitution.
Second, the existence of cultural differences between two polities is
by no means a sufficient condition for the development of differences
between their constitutions. Not every kind of difference between polities
is likely to show up in a constitution. A constitution, it bears repeating,
is apolitical document, and obviously is so understood by those who create
it to serve as a charter of self-government. To be sure, a constitution
inevitably reflects important cultural assumptions of those who made it.
Nevertheless, a constitution, at least in the American tradition, simply does
not embrace every aspect of the culture of its makers; it deals, on the
contrary, only with those aspects of culture that have been made the subject
of politics-which are, that is, contextually political for that society. It is
difficult to imagine a society for which every aspect of local culture is
imbued with political significance of constitutional dimension, and it is
even more difficult to imagine it for a society that embraces American tra-
ditions of liberalism. Of course there is no theoretical reason why a polity
could not adopt a totalizing constitution that aims to merge the cultural with
the political-perhaps an Islamic constitution that adopts by reference the
entire Sharia would qualify. But such a constitution would represent a
significant departure from American constitutional traditions, a degree of
deviation that no American constitution has ever approached.
187. SeeJames A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy andElections:Implementing PopularSovereignty
Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PiTr. L. REv. 189, 200-13 (1990) (arguing that the U.S.
Constitution reflects a theory of governmental legitimacy based on the writings of Locke and other
Enlightenment political philosophers).
188. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4, 95-98,122, 134, 140-41,
149-54 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690) (explaining that governments
should be formed through the voluntary consent of naturally equal, intelligent men); JOHN LOCKE,
ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 121-43 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Oxford
University Press 1984) (1690); ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 109
(Thomas G. West ed., Liberty Classics 1990) (1698) (claiming that consent is only given by "an
explicit act of approbation, when men have ability and courage to resist or deny").
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This notion of constitutions as representationally limited, and thus
possessing only a circumscribed ability to reflect cultural and character
differences of state polities, is reinforced in the American tradition by the
universal acceptance of the basic liberal distinction between a public and
a private realm. 9 Every American constitution, without exception,
acknowledges some aspects of life as private and thus attributes to them no
political ramifications, or at least none that are appropriately the subject of
constitutional regulation. It follows that any distinctive feature of a state
polity that falls within that polity's conception of the private realm is
unlikely to be reflected in the state constitution. For example, the way
people speak-their accents, pronunciation, and so forth-is in the
American tradition (though not, perhaps, the French) thought to be a
private matter, and it is difficult to imagine any American constitution
purporting to regulate such matters. Yet the way in which people speak
and express themselves is sometimes thought to be an important component
of cultural distinctiveness.190
A third factor limiting the degree to which American-style constitu-
tions are likely to reflect cultural differences is the fact that American
constitutions are widely understood to be reserved for important matters of
self-governance rather than the minutiae of daily politics. This
understanding flows from a set of familiar principles fundamental to
American constitutionalism. According to these principles, the purpose of
a constitution is to set out a society's decisions about its fundamental law
and to insulate those decisions from ordinary political processes by
precluding changes in the constitution without supermajority approval. At
the same time, a constitution is understood to be an appropriate place for
a society to create and empower a legislature to deal with matters of
everyday politics. Thus, a constitution by definition divides a society's
politics into the fundamental and the ordinary, reserving constitutional
status for the former. Consequently, even if many aspects of a state's
political life were driven by distinctive cultural features, it is unlikely that
189. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDmON 28 (1958) ("The distinction between a
private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the household and political realms, which have existed
as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state . . ").
190. It is often said, for example, that Southerners think more particularistically than other
Americans, which leads them to avoid abstractions in favor of concrete narratives. See, e.g., REED,
supra note 50, at 49-52 (describing Southern culture as "more particularistic than American culture"
and as having more emphasis on storytelling); id. at 163 (using "the approved Southern manner" of
"telling a lengthy anecdote" to describe Southern differences); THOMAS, supra note 85, at 19 (asserting
that the Southern mind focuses on "the here and now" and fears "abstraction"). Perhaps not
surprisingly, just the opposite has also been said of Southerners-for example, that they are
.unscientific" because they are "given to vague generalizations and inexact speech." EATON, supra
note 87, at 243-44.
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much of it would be reflected in the state constitution because the bulk of
culturally driven politics is unlikely to be deemed so fundamental by the
polity as to justify enshrinement in a constitution. Of course, state
constitutions are notorious for including provisions that often seem trivial
and unworthy of constitutional status.' 91 Nevertheless, this trend is far
from being pervasive enough to justify any expectation that multiple aspects
of a state's cultural distinctiveness will be reflected wholesale in its
constitution.
B. The Americanness of Southern Constitutions
1. The Constitution of the Confederate States of America.-If any
constitution is likely to reflect a distinctively Southern character and set of
values, it is the Constitution of the Confederate States of America (CSA).
The CSA Constitution was drafted by the states of the Lower South shortly
after they seceded from the Union."9  According to the thesis of
Southern distinctiveness, secession resulted in large part from the develop-
ment in the South of constitutionally significant differences of character and
values. 93 Moreover, the Confederacy's act of constitutional refounding
was intended, in this view, to create a new Southern nation more hospitable
to those distinctively Southern characteristics that caused the South to find
continued union with the North unacceptable."9 It follows that the CSA
Constitution, more than any other Southern constitution, ought to express
the values and aspirations of a distinctive South, brought at last to full
national self-consciousness.
The reality, however, is quite different: anyone hoping to find evi-
dence of Southern distinctiveness in the CSA Constitution will be sorely
disappointed. As Emory Thomas observes, "Ironically, the most striking
feature of the Confederate Constitution was not its Southern orientation.
The permanent Constitution prescribed for the Confederacy much the same
kind of union which the Southerners had dissolved."1" Or, as Carl
Degler puts it,
what is striking about the Confederacy is how congruent its
institutions and political values were with those of the United States.
One searches in vain through the Confederate Constitution, for
191. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 818-22 (discussing the detailed provisions included in various
state constitutions); James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 985, 988-1001 (1993) (outlining an approach for distinguishing between vital and nonvital constitu-
tional provisions).
192. See CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA CONST. of 1861, preamble.
193. See supra subpart III(A).
194. See id.
195. THOMAS, supra note 85, at 64.
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example, for those innovations and changes that would signal the
arrival on the world stage of a slaveholders' republic, which
repudiated the bourgeois elements characterizing the United
States. 196
Yet these authors understate the case: the CSA Constitution is virtually
word-for-word identical with the Constitution of the United States; its
authors essentially lifted the United States Constitution in its entirety, made
a few minor changes, and then adopted it as the founding charter of the
new Confederate nation."9  None of these changes, moreover, reflects
in any way the kinds of Southern distinctiveness that secessionists so loudly
proclaimed. Most of the provisions in the CSA Constitution that differ
from the United States Constitution merely contain the kinds of innovations
that by 1861 were becoming commonplace in state constitutions throughout
the nation-provisions like supermajority requirements for appropriations
legislation, single-subject rules, and rotation in office.'9 8  A few
provisions deal explicitly with slavery but do not treat it any differently
than the United States Constitution."9 A few other provisions incline the
CSA Constitution somewhat more favorably toward states' rights. For
example, states are authorized to impeach federal judges sitting within their
196. DEGLER, supra note 41, at 99.
197. It was, in McCardell's words, "a virtual duplicate of the United States Constitution."
MCCARDELL, supra note 57, at 337.
198. CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA CONsT. of 1861, art. I, § 9, cl. 9, 20; id. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1. The CSA Constitution was also the first in the nation to include an item veto, id. art. I, § 7, cl.
2, a now commonplace feature of state government. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State
Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1171, 1176 n.19 (1993). As Donald Nieman has argued, these changes
"were not peculiarly southern: they mirrored constitutional theory and practice in other sections and
were within the mainstream of American constitutional development." Donald Nieman, Republicanism,
the Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 201,202 (Kermit L. Hall & James
W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION]. "Many of the Confederate
Constitution's innovations," he adds, "were strikingly similar in both spirit and practice to
constitutional changes in the North before and after the Civil War .... [Tjhe spirit that animated
Confederate constitutional reform, far from being distinctively southern, was well within the
mainstream of the American constitutional tradition." Id. at 219. For an overview of these kinds of
provisions in state constitutional law, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 659-90,
692-96, 748-56, 799-856 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the item veto power of state governors; procedural
limitations on state legislatures; term limits; and the taxing, spending, and borrowing powers of state
legislatures).
199. The CSA Constitution retains the three-fifths clause and the fugitive slave clause.
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. In
addition, it continues the ban on the slave trade, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, and formalizes the holding of
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. It also explicitly authorizes
slavery in any new territories acquired by the CSA. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 3. A more radical provision
that would have limited admission of new states to slave states was rejected in favor of a compromise
that allowed the admission of free states on a two-thirds vote of Congress. See CHARLES R. LEE, JR.,
THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTIONS 112-16 (1963).
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borders,' and the congressional power over interstate commerce is more
limited." l Nevertheless, an orientation toward state power in a federal
system hardly qualifies as an organic manifestation of Southern
distinctiveness .22
No evidence of distinctive Southern values or character materializes
when we turn from the text of the CSA Constitution to its interpretation by
Southern officials; if anything, these interpretations only underscore the
degree to which the Confederate constitutional structure rests on constitu-
tional traditions that are distinctively American rather than Southern.
Because the CSA never appointed a Supreme Court,2 3 we must look to
constitutional interpretations made by other officials.
One of the major constitutional disputes that arose in the short life of
the Confederacy concerned the power of the Confederate government to
conscript citizens into military service. As the war began to strain
Confederate resources, the Confederate Congress instituted programs of
conscription and taxation.2' Many Southerners, habituated to thinking
in terms of the rightfulness of state power, found themselves opposing
these exercises of central CSA power. This led the central government
into numerous clashes with states' rights extremists.'0 One such antago-
nist was Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, who wrote to CSA
200. CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
201. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides that Congress has the power "To regulate commerce... among
the several States ... ; but neither this nor any other clause contained in the Constitution shall be
construed to delegate the power to Congress to appropriate money for any internal improvement
intended to facilitate commerce; except for the purpose of furnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and
other aids to navigation upon the coasts, and the improvement of harbors, and the removing of
obstructions in river navigation .... "
202. As David Potter has written, the states' rights position is "less a philosophical position than
a tactical device, attractive to any minority regardless of latitude, and the doctrine of national
supremacy [is one] exalted by those who possessed power and wanted to take advantage of it. Scratch
a spokesman of state sovereignty and you find, not necessarily a Southerner, but almost invariably a
man who sees that he is outnumbered . . . ." POTTER, supra note 48, at 74. At the Hartford
Convention during the War of 1812, the New England states, which opposed the war, due to the pro-
spect of interrupted overseas trade, grumbled about states' rights and high-handed exercises of national
power. See JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815, at 306-08 (1970); see also Herman Belz,
The South and the American Constitutional Tradition at the Bicentennial, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION, supra note 198, at 17, 33 (stating that leading Southern historians claim that the purpose
of the CSA Constitution was "to uphold and perpetuate the fundamental principles of the American
Constitution"); LEE, supra note 199, at 62 ("The Montgomery delegates were not dissatisfied with the
United States Constitution; indeed, they held it dear. The South had always been proud of its part in
the Philadelphia Convention.. . . The Montgomery Convention intended to retain the old instrument
of government, making such changes as history and experience directed to be urgent and necessary.").
203. See LEE, supra note 199, at 109-10.
204. See ESCOTT, supra note 95, at 63-73 (describing the various methods used by the South to
raise revenue).
205. See id. at 86-90 (discussing various state government challenges to the CSA conscription
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President Jefferson Davis complaining that the conscription law was
unconstitutional.2' Davis's reply is revealing. "I hold," he wrote,
that when a specific power is granted by the Constitution ...
Congress is the judge whether the law passed for the purpose of
executing that power is "necessary and proper." It is not enough to
say that armies might be raised in other ways, and that therefore this
particular way is not "necessary." . . . The true and only test is to
enquire whether the law is intended and calculated to carry out the
object whether it devises and creates an instrumentality for executing
the specific power granted; and if the answer be in the affirmative,
the law is constitutional. 2°7
This language is immediately recognizable as a concise restatement of
Chief Justice John Marshall's analysis of the United States Constitution's
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland.2 8
A similar reliance on the reasoning of United States courts under the
United States Constitution appears in judicial opinions addressing the same
question. In Burroughs v. Peyton,' for example, the Virginia Supreme
Court upheld the Confederate conscription law against a constitutional chal-
lenge by several conscripts.' To decide this question, the court looked not
to Southern values or legal traditions, but to American ones: "The clauses
of the Confederate constitution relating to the military power and its
exercise," the court said, "have been adopted without change from the
constitution of the United States .... Whatever therefore throws light
upon the meaning of the constitution of the United States, on this point,
throws equal light upon the meaning of ours."210 The court then made
an extensive survey of the American experience during the revolutionary
period, canvassed the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the United States
Constitution, and reviewed subsequent U.S. history, including numerous
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.211 Furthermore, in decid-
ing whether the power of conscription lay in the Confederate Congress or
in the states, the possibility that the allocation of state and federal power
under a Confederate Constitution might differ from the allocation under the
United States Constitution apparently did not even occur to the Virginia
court.2
1 2
206. See id. at 81-82 (detailing Governor Brown's "long philippic" against conscription including
constitutional attacks on the law).
207. Id. at 83 (quoting Letter to Joseph E. Brown (May 29, 1862), in 5 JEFFERSON DAVIS:
CONSTITUTIONALIST: HIS LETTERS, PAPERS, AND SPEECHES 254, 256-57 (Dunbar Rowland ed., 1923)).
208. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819).
209. 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 470 (1864).
210. Id. at 474.
211. See id. at 485-92.
212. See id. at 473-85. The Confederate conscription laws were upheld by every state court to
consider them. See Ex parte Tate, 39 Ala. 254, 256-57 (1864) (upholding repeal of substitute
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By far the largest body of interpretations of the Confederate
Constitution may be found in the opinions of the Confederate Attorneys
General.213 Dozens of opinions issued by four different Attorneys
General expound the meaning of provisions of the CSA Constitution and
provide advice to CSA officers on a wide variety of constitutional
problems. Yet if these opinions reveal anything, it is that Confederate
officials at the highest levels, presumably among the Southerners most
committed to Southern distinctiveness and separate nationhood, simply did
not understand the Confederate Constitution to require a different interpre-
tive approach than that required by the United States Constitution.
In opinion after opinion, the Attorneys General approach and construe
the CSA Constitution precisely as they would were they sitting in a law
office somewhere in the United States of America interpreting the United
States Constitution. Methodologically, their opinions show their acceptance
of standard American principles of constitutional interpretation prevailing
at the time-for example, that the plain language of the constitutional text
controls its meaning"l and that history and precedent may be consulted
to illuminate the meaning of the text. I5 Substantively, they openly
exemption); Exparte Hill, 38 Ala. 458, 479-85 (1863) (upholding conscription); Parker v. Kaughman,
34 Ga. 136, 139-41 (1865) (upholding repeal of disability exemption); Barber v. Irwin, 34 Ga. 28, 31-
33 (1864) (upholding repeal of agricultural exemption); Daly v. Harris, 33 Ga. 38, 52-55 (1864)
(upholding repeal of substitute exemption); Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347, 348-51 (1862) (upholding basic
conscription law); Simmons v. Miller, 40 Miss. 19 (1864) (upholding conscription); Gatlin v. Walton,
60 N.C. (Win.) 325, 331-34 (1864) (upholding conscription and repeal of substitute exemption); Ex
parte Mayer, 27 Tex. 715, 718 (1864) (upholding repeal of substitute exemption); Ex parte Turman,
26 Tex. 708 (1863) (finding that the conscription of a man charged with a crime did not violate the
state constitution's guarantee of a speedy trial); Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387 (1862) (upholding
conscription).
The only CSA defeat in a state court was the Georgia Supreme Court's invalidation of the con-
scription laws as applied to state officials. The court ruled that the conscription of state officials would
put the very existence of state governments at the mercy of the Confederacy, a result contrary to the
structure of the federal constitution and violative of the federal constitutional guarantee of state repub-
lican government. See Andrews v. Strong, 33 Ga. 166, 170-72 (1864).
213. These opinions are collected in THE OPINIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
1861-1865 (Rembert W. Patrick ed., 1950) [hereinafter CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS].
214. This point is made most explicitly in Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon. Jas. A. Seddon,
Oct. 25, 1864), in CONFEDERATEAG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 520, 520; see also Op. Confederate
Att'y Gen. (To President Jefferson Davis, May 16, 1862), in CONFEDERATEAG OPINIONS, supra note
213, at 94, 96; Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon. Henry St. George Offutt, July 18, 1862), in
CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 117, 119; Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To President
Jefferson Davis, Aug. 14, 1862), in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 136, 141; Op.
Confederate Att'y Gen. (To President Jefferson Davis, July 8, 1863), in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS,
supra note 213, at 293, 293-94.
215. See, e.g., Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To President Jefferson Davis, May 16, 1862), ;n
CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 94, 97-99; Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon.
S.R. Mallory, Nov. 13, 1862), in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 173, 176-77; Op.
Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon. Jno. Reagan, May 8, 1863), in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra
note 213, at 261, 263-65; Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Secretary of the Treasury, Mar. 5, 1864),
in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 387, 390-91.
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embraced, without any apparent need for justification, such familiar
principles of American constitutional law as separation of powers,
216
judicial review,217 and the limitation of governmental powers to those
either specifically enumerated or logically inferred. 28  And when the
guidance of historical practice or prior interpretation was required, the
Attorneys General turned immediately to United States sources such as the
opinions of the United States Attorney General219 or the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.230
In only one area did the Confederate Attorneys General depart materi-
ally from practice under the United States Constitution-the area of states'
rights. In an opinion issued March 4, 1863, Attorney General Thomas Hill
Watts set out a Confederate account of the nature of the Union." In his
view, citizens of the states "were never, since the Declaration of
Independence of the King of Great Britain, member-citizens of the same
political community .... The United States, in the relation which they
bore to the Citizens of the several States, never constituted a Nation."'
This, Watts declared, was the "cardinal principle of State Rights," which
was "[t]he fundamental principle upon which the several Confederate States
withdrew from the U.S. Government."'  Again, though, it would
stretch notions of Southern distinctiveness to the breaking point to insist
that an inclination toward decentralized power in a federal system somehow
grows organically from Southern character traits, or lies so far from
Northern values as to be incompatible with them. In any event, as we have
seen, such a conclusion is undermined not only by the fact that the
Confederacy soon found itself exercising extensive centralized power
through conscription and taxation, as well as through the establishment of
216. Op. Confederate At'y Gen. (To Hon. James A. Seddon, May 22, 1863), in CONFEDERATE
AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 268, 268; see Op. Confederate Atty Gen. (To Hon. George A.
Trenholm, Sept. 20, 1864), in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 504, 505-06.
217. See Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon. James A. Seddon, May 22, 1863), in
CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 269, 273; Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon.
George A. Trenholm, Sept. 20, 1864), in CONFEDERATEAG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 504, 505;
Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To the Secretary of the Treasury, Jan. 11, 1865), in CONFEDERATE AG
OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 547, 548.
218. See Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To President Jefferson Davis, May 16, 1862), in
CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 94, 94-95.
219. See Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon. S.R. Mallory, May 6, 1862), in CONFEDERATE
AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 85, 85-86; Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To Hon. Jno. Reagan, May
8, 1863), in CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 261, 262-63.
220. See Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To President Jefferson Davis, Aug. 8, 1863), in
CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 311, 311-13.
221. See Op. Confederate Att'y Gen. (To President Jefferson Davis, Mar. 4, 1863), in
CONFEDERATE AG OPINIONS, supra note 213, at 231, 238-41.
222. Id. at 239-40 (emphasis in original).
223. Id. at 240.
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national welfare programs to relieve war-induced hunger, 4 but also by
the ease with which the defeated South slipped back into the national polit-
ical framework.'
If Confederate officials and Southern judicial officers approached and
interpreted the CSA Constitution using the methods and doctrines with
which they were familiar from United States constitutional law, one might
perhaps respond that they were simply prisoners of their American training
and upbringing. Yet that is precisely the point. Confederate officials
acquired and internalized their understandings of law, of constitutions, and
of the principles underlying the formation and construction of constitutional
government as Americans, not as Southerners. They could no more have
awakened one morning to find themselves holding a Southern view of
constitutional language and interpretation materially different from the
prevailing American view than they could have awakened to find them-
selves the possessors of a Southern character materially different from the
prevailing American one.1 6
Indeed, the Confederacy's appropriation of the United States
Constitution and accompanying principles of constitutional law and interp-
retation are only one manifestation of a broader trend. One of the prin-
cipal assumptions of the New Judicial Federalism is that a state's unique-
ness will find its expression in state efforts to differentiate itself from
actions and approaches of other jurisdictions, particularly the United States.
This assumption, however, is belied by the experience of the Confederacy.
In fact, CSA officials initially attempted to legitimate secession and the
founding of a new nation less by differentiating South from North than by
appropriating American history, American political beliefs, and American
symbols for the Confederacy.
The Great Seal of the CSA, for example, depicted an equestrian
George Washington, and Washington and Jefferson appeared on CSA
postage stamps along with Davis and Calhoun.J 7 Davis chose to be
inaugurated at the base of a statue of Washington on Washington's
birthday, and a popular ballad hailed Davis as "our second
Washington."' In his public addresses during 1861, Davis claimed that
224. See THOMAS, supra note 85, at 298.
225. See supra subsection III(B)(5).
226. In the words of Confederate Senator Williamson S. Oldham of Texas: "men who had for
years attached themselves to their parties and party leaders, who had for years, been taught by the latter
to glorify the Union, as the greatest blessing ... could not in the course of a few days surrender up
sentiments, they had entertained all their lives." BERINGER ET AL., supra note 72, at 33 (quoting
Williamson S. Oldham, Memoirs of W.S. Oldham, Confederate Senator, 1861-1865, at 143-45
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin)).
227. See THOMAS, supra note 85, at 222.
228. See FAUST, supra note 73, at 14.
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"the Confederacy was the true embodiment of American principles of
government. Rather than destroying the American system, the formation
of the Confederacy preserved and vindicated it. The Confederacy had
become the guardian of the founders' legacy." 9 The CSA's "[p]ublic
rhetoric and national symbols continually played upon the theme of the
Confederacy as lineal descendant of the American revolutionary
process." ° In so doing, the Confederates "intended to claim American
nationalism as their own, to give themselves at once an identity and a
history."' It is thus by no means the case that a state or region, thin-
king itself distinct, will necessarily express its distinctiveness by distancing
itself from the national heritage; it is equally possible that any such distinc-
tiveness could take the form of a powerful dedication to national traditions,
national symbols, and national legal and constitutional principles.
Of course, some historians interpret the South's embrace of American
national history and symbols as evidence of its lack of true distinctiveness.
As Emory Thomas observes, much of this activity was "propaganda and
self-delusion," the purpose of which was to "identify the new Southern
nation with a sacred heritage and establish innocence by association." 2
No one has put this point more strongly than Kenneth Stampp: "By 1861,"
Stampp writes, "it was too late for Southerners to escape [their American]
heritage, and rather than seeking to escape it they claimed it as their own.
But in doing so they confessed rather pathetically the speciousness of
southern nationalism." 3
2. Constitutions of Southern States.
a. Constitutional texts.-Between 1776 and 1861, the eleven
states of the Confederacy framed and ratified a total of twenty-one
constitutions.234  Yet these constitutions, like the Confederate
229. Escor, supra note 95, at 40; see also MCPHERSON, supra note 151, at 30 ("Confederates
regarded themselves as the true heirs of American nationalism, custodians of the ideals for which their
forefathers of 1776 had fought.").
230. THOMAS, supra note 85, at 222.
231. FAUST, supra note 73, at 14.
232. THOMAS, supra note 85, at 222.
233. STAMPP, supra note 100, at 258.
234. Alabama had only one constitution during this period, adopted at the time of its admission
to the Union in 1819. See 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
96 (1909). Arkansas also had only one constitution dating from 1836. Id. at 268. Florida's only con-
stitution likewise dated from its admission in 1838. 2 id. at 664. Georgia adopted three constitutions-
in 1777, 1789, and 1798. Id. at 777, 785, 791. Louisiana had three: 1812, 1845, and 1852. 3 id.
at 1380, 1392, 1411. Mississippi had two, in 1817 and 1832. 4 id. at 2032, 2049. North Carolina
had one, adopted in 1776. 5 id. at 2787. South Carolina adopted three, in 1776, 1778, and 1790.
6 id. at 3241, 3248, 3258. Tennessee adopted two, in 1796 and 1834. 6 id. at 3414, 3426. Virginia
had three-in 1776, 1830, and 1850. 7 id. at 3812, 3819, 3829. Texas adopted only one constitution,
in 1845, unless one also counts the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas. 6 id. at 3532, 3547.
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Constitution, provide little evidence of the kind of Southern distinctiveness
discussed earlier. The main impression yielded by a review of the
Southern states' constitutions is that they are strikingly similar to each
other, to contemporaneous constitutions of Northern and Western states,
and to the United States Constitution. Not only are there few provisions
intimating, however suggestively, that Southern constitutions were drafted
and ratified by people holding values different from those prevailing else-
where in the United States, but those provisions that do seem to offer
potential constitutional evidence of Southern distinctiveness usually turn out
not to be uniquely Southern at all.
For example, evidence of the South's reputed penchant for violence
might be reflected in constitutional provisions from Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia that disqualified from public
office anyone who had fought a duel.'~ Yet precisely the same disquali-
fication appears in antebellum constitutions of California, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin 6-- states not ordinarily
associated with a culture of violence. Moreover, it would be difficult to
maintain that Southern constitutions reflect, for interpretational purposes,
a Southern character trait of violence when these documents specifically
condemn duelling, thereby officially repudiating the very trait they would
otherwise be said to reflect. 7
The South is also sometimes said to have been more religious than
other regions. Certainly, Southern constitutions reveal a keen interest in
religious matters. For example, Georgia's 1777 constitution and South
Carolina's 1778 constitution limit public office holders to
Protestants23--but so do the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 and the
New Hampshire Constitutions of 1784 and 1792.11 The Massachusetts
235. See FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VI, § 5; LA. CONST. of 1852, art. 126; LA. CONST. of 1845,
art. 130; MIss. CONST. of 1832, art. VII, § 2; MiSS. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, § 2; TENN. CONsr. of
1834, art. IX, § 3; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 5; VA. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 17; VA.
CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 12.
236. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 2; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 3; IND. CONST.
of 1851, art. II, § 7; IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 5; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 8; OR.
CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 9; Wis. CONsT. of 1848, art. XIII, § 2.
237. Similarly, laws banning the carrying of concealed weapons were upheld, by every Southern
court to consider them, against challenges based on state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right
to bear arms. See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State,
1 Ga. 243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154
(1840).
238. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XIII. Several other Southern
constitutions contained a more general religious qualification for public office, typically a belief in God.
See ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VII, § 2; Miss. CONST. of 1832, art. VII, § 2; Miss. CONsr. of 1817,
art. VI, § 6; N.C. CONsr. of 1776, art. XXXII; TENN. CONsr. of 1834, art. IX, § 2; TENN. CONST.
of 1796, art. VIII, § 2.
239. See N.H. CONSr. of 1792, Part II, §§ XIV, XXIX, XLII; N.H. CONST. of 1784, Part II,
Senate, 10; id. Part II, House of Representatives, 5; id. Part II, President, 2; N.J. CONSr. of
1776, § XIX.
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Constitution of 1780, somewhat more generously, allows public offices to
be filled by any Christian.2' Not only do these New England
constitutions contain provisions parallel to those appearing in their Southern
counterparts, but by 1790 both Georgia and South Carolina, like most other
states, had phased out these qualifications.24' In so doing, they brought
their constitutions into conformity with those of other states in all regions
of the nation, including the South, and with the federal Constitution.
Another unusual religious provision found in numerous Southern
constitutions is a provision barring practicing ministers from holding public
office. 42 Yet it is hardly possible to argue that such provisions reflect
a uniquely Southern attitude toward religious life when the same provision
may be found in New York's constitutions of 1777 and 1821.243 In
addition, it is hard to say just what attitude toward religion these exclusions
reveal. By their own terms, the minister-exclusion provisions were
intended to assure that ministers tend to their flocks, and the provisions
may thus represent a kind of state protection of the integrity of religious
worship.2' But an equally plausible explanation might be that these
provisions create an additional barrier between church and state by prevent-
ing sectarian colonization of government offices. If so, constitutions
containing these provisions evince a respect for religious life, but a
religious life that is confined primarily to the private sphere. This is just
the opposite of what one might expect in light of claims for the centrality
of religion to a Southern constitutional-that is to say, public-culture.
If any Southern constitution stands out for its public treatment of
religion, it is South Carolina's constitution of 1778, which establishes
Protestantism as the official state religion.245 Once again, though, the
provision in question was soon eliminated by the constitution of 1790, and
240. See MASS. CONSr. Part the Second, ch. II, § I, art. II (stating the requirement that the
governor be a Christian).
241. See generally GA. CONSr. of 1789; S.C. CONST. of 1790.
242. See FLA. CONsT. of 1838, art. VI, § 10; LA. CONST. of 1845, art. 29; LA. CONsT. of 1812,
art. Hl, § 22; Miss. CONSr. of 1817, art. VI, § 7; N.C. CONSr. of 1776, art. XXXI; S.C. CONsT. of
1790, art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXI; TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IX, § 1; TENN.
CONST. of 1796, art. VII, § 1; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 27; REPuB. TEX. CONST. of 1836,
art. V, § 1, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAs 1822-1897, at 1069, 1075 (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1898); VA. CONSr. of 1830, art. III, § 7.
243. See N.Y. CONsT. of 1821, art. VII, § 4; N.Y. CONsr. of 1777, art. XXXIX.
244. A typical version provides: "whereas the ministers of the gospel are, by their profession,
dedicated to the service of God and the care of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties
of their function, therefore no minister of the gospel or public preacher of any religious persuasion,
whilst he continues in the exercise of his pastoral functions, shall be eligible to the office of governor,
lieutenant-governor, or to a seat in the senate or house of representatives." S.C. CONST. of 1790, art.
i, § 23.
245. See S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII.
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it thus provides little support for the existence of a distinctive Southern
character trait during the period when South and North are said to have
been growing apart.2'
The treatment of slavery is another area in which Southern
constitutions might be thought to reflect distinctively Southern values,
if they existed. Yet one of the most surprising things about the
constitutions of Southern states, like the Constitution of the Confederate
States of America, is how little they say about slavery. The Georgia
Constitutions of 1777 and 1789, the South Carolina Constitution of 1776,
and the Virginia Constitution of 1776 make no mention of slavery
whatsoever.247  And constitutions from Louisiana, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia mention slavery only indirectly, either through the
use of a three-fifths clause for purposes of apportionment,24 as in the
United States Constitution," or in the limitation of certain rights to
freemen2 0
Of course, it would be odd if no Southern constitution dealt with an
institution as important to Southern life as slavery, and most do so by
acknowledging and to some extent formalizing or regulating various aspects
of the slave system. Some constitutions, for example, take up administra-
tive matters such as the taxation251 and movement 2 of slaves and the
conditions of emancipation, 3 while others authorize the enactment of
humane slave laws.' Many constitutions state formally, and perhaps
somewhat redundantly, the conditions of American slavery: that only
246. See S.C. CONsT. of 1790.
247. See generally GA. CONST. of 1789; GA. CONST. of 1777; S.C. CONST. of 1776; VA. CONST.
of 1776.
248. See VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 6.
249. See U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 2, cI. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
250. See LA. CONST. of 1852, arts. 10, 59; LA. CONST. of 1845, arts. 6, 10, 60; LA. CONST. of
1812, art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 22; N.C. CONST. of 1776, §§ VIl-IX; id. Declaration of Rights,
§§ VIII-IX, XII-XIII; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III, § 1; id. art. XI, §§ 8, 14, 26. The term
"freemen" was sometimes construed to exclude free blacks. See State v. Claibome, 19 Tenn. (Meigs)
331, 341 (1838).
251. See VA. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 23.
252. See ARK. CONsT. of 1836, art. IV, § 25; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. XVI, §§ 2-3; GA.
CONsT. of 1798, art. 1H, § 11; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. VII, §§ 1-2; Miss. CONST. of 1817, art.
VI, § 1; TEx. CONST. of 1845, art. VIII, § 1; REPUB. TEx. CONST. of 1836, General Provisions, §
9, reprinted in I GAMMEL, supra note 242, at 1079.
253. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 1; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VII, § 1; FLA. CONsr.
of 1838, art. XVI, § 1; MISS. CONSr. of 1832, art. VII, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, § 1;
TENN. CoNsT. of 1834, art. II, § 31; TEx. CoNsr. of 1845, art. VIII, § 1; REPUB. TEX. CONST. of
1836, General Provisions, § 9, reprinted in I GAMMEL, supra note 242, at 1079; VA. CONST. of 1850,
art. IV, §§ 19-21.
254. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 1; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VI, § 1; TEx. CONST.
of 1845, art. VIII, § 1.
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whites could be citizens, 5  hold public office, 6 or vote; 57 and that
the principles of equal rights25 8 and due process 19 apply only to
freemen.
While these provisions certainly reveal that slavery was practiced in
the South, it is less clear that they reveal anything more about Southern
character or values than is revealed in the knowledge that Southerners
practiced slavery. That is, one's opinion about whether the South's history
of slavery reflects a set of values different from those held in the North
will depend principally on one's opinion about the values reflected in the
practice of slavery itself, and not in the values reflected by the institutional-
ization of slavery at the constitutional level.
Furthermore, any analysis of the significance of provisions in Southern
constitutions concerning slavery must account for the fact that many
Northern and Western state constitutions of the same period, as well as the
United States Constitution, contain similar provisions. The United States
Constitution contains three provisions that acknowledge and formalize the
practice of slavery: the three-fifths clause,' the fugitive slave
clause,"5 ' and the protection until 1808 of the slave trade. 62 Among
non-Southern states, the right to vote was restricted to whites or freemen
in Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 3 Iowa, Kansas, and
255. See REPUB. TEx. CONST. of 1836, General Provisions, §§ 6, 10, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL,
supra note 242, at 1079-80.
256. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 5; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, §§ 4, 6; FLA.
CONST. of 1838, art. IV, §§ 4-5; LA. CONST. of 1845, art. 6; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 4; S.C.
CONST. of 1790, art. I, §§ 6, 8.
257. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. IlI, § 5; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 2; FLA. CONST.
of 1838, art. VI, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. IX; LA. CONST. of 1852, art. 10; LA. CONST. of
1845, art. 10; LA. CONsT. of 1812, art. II, § 8; MIss. CONST. of 1832, art. IlI, § 1; MISS. CONST.
of 1817, art. III, § 1; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, §§ VII-VIII; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3
(1835); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XIII; TENN. CONST. of 1834, art.
IV, § 1; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III, § 1; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. III, §§ 1-2.
258. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 1; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 1; FLA. CONST. of
1838, art. I, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 1; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 1; TEx. CONST.
of 1845, art. I, § 2.
259. See ARK. CONsT. of 1836, art. IU, § 10; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. of
1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XII; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLI; TENN. CONST. of 1834,
Declaration of Rights, art. I, § 8; TENN. CONSr. of 1796, Declaration of Rights, art. XI, § 8. For
obvious reasons, the right to bear arms was also often expressly restricted to whites or freemen. See
FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 21; LA. CONST. of 1852, art. 59; LA. CONs. of 1845, art. 60; LA.
CONsT. of 1812, art. III, § 22; TENN. CONET. of 1834, art. I, § 26; TENN. CONST. of 1796,
Declaration of Rights, art. XI, § 26.
260. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
261. See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
262. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
263. See CONN. CONS1T. of 1818, art. VI, § 2; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; DEL. CONST.
of 1792, art. VI; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; IND. CONST.
of 1816, art. VI, § 1; IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 1; IOWA CONET. art. 2, § 1 (amended 1868);
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Michigan barred blacks from holding public office.2' Illinois, Indiana,
and Oregon prohibited blacks from entering the state, 265 and Illinois and
Oregon limited due process and equality rights to freemen or whites.26
The presence of such restrictions in Northern and Western constitutions
undermines the claim that they reflect uniquely Southern character traits
and values.
Perhaps the Southern constitution that suggests most strongly the kind
of value differences attributed to the South by supporters of the difference
thesis is the South Carolina Constitution of 1778. While property
qualifications for office holding were not uncommon among the first
generation of American constitutions,267 the 1778 South Carolina
Constitution limits eligibility for the office of governor to those possessing
a freehold of "at least ten thousand pounds currency, clear of debt," 68
and eligibility for the Senate to those possessing a freehold of two thousand
pounds. 269  These requirements far exceed any property-holding
limitations set by other states; Georgia, for example, at that time required
of its officials property in the amount of 250 pounds,270 and Virginia
required only that its officials be freeholders."7 Outside the South, only
Delaware, Massachusetts, and New Jersey come close, requiring one
thousand pounds of candidates for certain offices.' The amount
KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. II, § 2; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1
(amended 1923); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; OR. CONSr. art. II, § 6 (repealed 1927); PA.
CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 6; Wis.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (amended 1882). In New York, blacks were permitted to vote, but only if they
were freeholders in the amount of $250. See N.Y. CONsT. of 1846, art. II, § 1; N.Y. CONST. of
1821, art. II, § 1.
264. See IowA CONST. art. 2, § 1 (amended 1868); KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. IV, § 4; MICH.
CONST. of 1835, art. IV, § 7.
265. See ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIV; IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (amended 1881); OR. CONST.
art. II, § 6 (repealed 1927).
266. See ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 8; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 8; OR. CONST.
art. I, § 32 (repealed 1970).
267. See DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 3 (200 acres or 1000 pounds for senators); GA. CONSr.
of 1777, art. VI (250 acres or 250 pounds for representatives); MASS. CONST. Part the Second, ch. II,
§ I, art. H (1000 pounds for governor); id. Part the Second, ch. I, § II, art. V (300 pounds for
senators); id. Part the Second, ch. I, § I, art. 111 (100 pounds for representatives); N.H. CONST. of
1784, Part II, Senate, 10 and President, 2 (200 pounds for senators, 500 pounds for president);
N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 1II (500 pounds for assembly, 1000 pounds for council); N.C. CONSI. of 1776,
arts. V-VI (300 acres for senators, 100 acres for representatives); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. X (100
pounds for senators).
268. S.C. CONsr. of 1778, art. V.
269. See id. art. XII. Representatives were also required to possess significant property, but the
amount was set by legislation. Id. art. XIII.
270. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI.
271. See VA. CONST. of 1776, 2-3.
272. See DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 3 (senators); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 3
(senators); MASS. CONST. Part the Second, ch. II, § I, art. II (governor); N.J. CONsT. of 1776, § III
(council).
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required to serve as South Carolina Governor dwarfs property eligibility
requirements for voters; this sum, for example, is fully one thousand times
the property qualification required to vote in Georgia.27 In this respect,
then, the South Carolina Constitution of 1778 came as close as any
American constitution ever has to creating an aristocratic form of
government. 274 Moreover, if, as seems likely, the few who could qualify
to rule would have been overwhelmingly planters and slaveholders, then
the political aristocracy so created would have been something like the
social and economic aristocracy said to dominate South Carolina life and
culture during the antebellum period.s
With the adoption of a new constitution in 1790, however, South
Carolina quickly concluded its experiment in plutocracy. The property
requirement for governor, though still substantial, was reduced to fifteen
hundred pounds, 6 and the requirements for senator and representative
were cut to three hundred pounds and one hundred fifty pounds,
respectively.2' In other states, too, high property qualifications were
ultimately phased out. For example, Louisiana's property qualifications,
273. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. IX.
274. As Madison observed, "A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well
by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect." JAMES MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966).
275. While it is notoriously difficult to make historical comparisons of income, a rough idea of
the exclusivity of the eligibility requirements for South Carolina governor can be gleaned from available
historical materials. The exchange rate stood at approximately $4.50 to the pound in 1798-1800. See
LEE SOLTOW, DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1798, at 203 (1989).
At this rate, a candidate for governor would have needed a net worth of $45,000. According to con-
sumer price index tables published by the Commerce Department, prices increased approximately nine-
fold between 1800 and 1995. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 210-11 (1975) (1800 = 51; 1970
= 116.3); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 483 tbl.745 (1996) (1970 = 38.8, 1995 = 152.4); see also THE VALUE OF A DOLLAR:
PRICES AND INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1989, at 2 (Scott Derks ed., 1994) (finding a five-
fold increase in prices between 1860 and 1989). These figures yield a current equivalent net worth of
just over $400,000.
Perhaps more to the point are estimates of how many South Carolinians would have been eligible
to serve as governor under the 1778 constitution. According to Soltow, the average wealth of an
American free male over the age of 21 was approximately $1,000. See SOLTOW, supra, at 27. Soltow
estimates the number of Americans worth $10,000 or more in 1801 at 4100, id. at 134, and the total
number of Americans worth $50,000 or more in 1798 at just over 100, id. at 47 tbl.9. If this number
is accurate, the number of eligible people in South Carolina would have been no more than a handful.
Finally, Marion Chandler, an archivist at the South Carolina Dept. of Archives and History, was
kind enough to perform a brief search of a computerized database of South Carolina conveyance
records and estate inventories. Mr. Chandler's search turned up the names of about 25 people who
might have been able to meet the eligibility requirement in 1784.
276. See S.C. CONsr. of 1790, art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
277. See id. art. I, §§ 6, 8.
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which in 1812 stood at $5000 for governor and $1000 for senators,27
were eliminated entirely in the Constitution of 1845. 9 Thus, it cannot
very plausibly be maintained that Southern constitutions reflect the kind of
aristocratic, plantation-centered value system which the South is often said
to have possessed. Property qualifications were being lowered at the very
time the South is said to have been growing apart from the North-the
record shows regional convergence rather than divergence. Indeed,
historians who have studied this record argue that the democratization of
Southern office holding is simply one aspect of the Jacksonian egalitarian-
ism that swept all parts of the nation during the 1820s and 1830s.1
b. Judicial interpretation.-While the absence of textual evidence
tends to undermine the proposition that Southern constitutions reflect
distinctively Southern character and values, it is not dispositive. One of
the key premises of the New Judicial Federalism is that commonly
employed constitutional terms like freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
or due process of law might mean different things in different states
because the people of each state bring to these phrases local understandings
informed by local values and beliefs. Consequently, we must look not only
to the constitutional texts for evidence of Southern distinctiveness, but also
to judicial interpretations of the texts.
A review of the antebellum and Confederate decisions of the supreme
courts of the Confederate states, however, discloses no more evidence of
Southern distinctiveness than do the constitutional texts themselves. 81
As an initial matter, the state judicial decisions might seem like fertile
ground for evidence of unique state values if only because so many state
courts were so active in the development of a robust state constitutionalism.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which by the eve of the Civil
War had struck down only two federal laws-in Marbury v. Madison,
and Dred Scott v. Sandfordm -state supreme courts during the same
278. See LA. CONST. of 1812, art. III, § 4; id. art. II, § 12.
279. See LA. CONST. of 1845, arts. 18, 39.
280. See, e.g., CLEMENT EATON, A HISTORY OF THE OLD SOUTH 270-72 (2d ed. 1966);
MCWHINEY, supra note 121, at 131.
281. For this study, I have examined every reported state constitutional decision issued between
1776 and 1865 by the highest court of each Confederate state except South Carolina, which I excluded
because my library did not contain an indexed annotated set of the relevant decisions. In conducting
this review, I relied exclusively on indices of the decisions prepared by the official reporters. While
these indices were for the most part very thorough and well done, this was not uniformly the case, and
it is likely that I was not directed to every relevant decision. I am confident, however, that the account
set out in the text is more than adequately supported by the decisional law.
282. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803) (holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it attempted to add to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as provided in
Article I1, Section 2).
283. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 441-42 (1857) (holding that the Missouri Compromise was invalid
insofar as Congress had no power to outlaw slavery in territories acquired in the Louisiana Purchase).
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period struck down dozens of state laws. During this same period the
Tennessee Supreme Court, for example, alone invalidated at least ten state
actions.' A clear indication of the seriousness with which Southern
courts viewed their state constitutions is the fact that they continued to
strike down state laws throughout the period of the Civil War-a time
of severe crisis and deprivation during which state courts might have been
expected to show a good deal more deference to the legislative and
executive branches.'
While Southern courts were active, their decisions provide little
support for the distinctiveness hypothesis. The subject matter of the state
constitutional rulings for the most part reflects the standard preoccupations
284. See, e.g., Morgan v. Reed, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 275, 281-82 (1858) (invalidating a statute
which purported to nullify a previous statute on the grounds that the former was passed only for the
benefit of an individual, thereby violating the state constitution); State v. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. (3
Sneed) 634, 655-56 (1856) (invalidating a law allowing circuit courts to grant charters of
incorporation); State v. Fleming, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 151, 153-54 (1846) (invalidating a statute that
provided for the discharge of two individuals indicted for violating another statute); Governorv. Porter,
24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 165, 167-68 (1844) (voiding a statute that required a specific construction of
another statute on the grounds that the state constitution extended the authority to determine statutory
construction to only the judiciary); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59, 69-71 (1836)
(invalidating a statute on the grounds that the statute amounted to a judgment for an individual, and
thus, the legislature had violated the state constitution by assuming powers within the exclusive domain
of the judiciary); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 599, 607-08 (1831) (nullifying a
statute that created a special tribunal because the tribunal's powers conflicted with the powers provided
to the state supreme court under the state constitution); Marr v. Enloe, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 452, 459
(1830) (striking down a law delegating taxation power to county courts); Jones v. Kearns, 8 Tenn.
(Mart. & Yer.) 241, 246-48 (1827) (holding invalid a state court practice that required a plaintiff to
give new security in costs or have his case dismissed); Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1, 18-
19 (1821) (using both the federal and state constitutions to strike down a law requiring a two-year delay
on the execution of judgments); Barrows v. Page, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 97, 98-100 (1818) (concluding
that a defendant's trespass of a private citizen's food supply on behalf of a militia was indefensible
because there was neither a showing of extreme necessity, as required in the Tennessee Bill of Rights,
nor a statutory authorization of the trespass).
Not every Southern supreme court devoted such attention to its state constitution; the North
Carolina Supreme Court, for example, seems to have interpreted the state constitution in any depth only
once. See State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250, 254-55 (1844) (upholding a law barring free
negroes from carrying firearms). Unlike, for instance, the Alabama Supreme Court, which evidently
thrived on constitutional interpretation, the North Carolina Supreme Court seemed far more comfortable
adjudicating in a common-law mode.
285. See, e.g., Ex parte Haughton, 38 Ala. 570 (1863) (striking down as a violation of the state
constitutional right of appeal a state vagrant law that provided no mechanism for appeals); Alabama
Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510 (1863) (striking down on separation of powers and due
process grounds a state law reviving a conveyance previously invalidated by the court); Burt v.
Williams, 24 Ark. 91 (1863) (invalidating state legislation that granted an automatic continuance for
all criminal and civil cases until after the Civil War on the grounds that the law violated the Arkansas
Constitution's guarantee of speedy trials).
286. Certainly the United States Supreme Court has a history of bowing to the decisions of a war-
time government. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II
domestic internment of citizens of Japanese ancestry).
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of early nineteenth century American constitutional law: banking; 2"
railroads, canals, and other internal improvements; 8 and the jurisdiction
of courts.289 When the decisions are not focused on technical aspects of
governmental structure, their focus is overwhelmingly on constitutional
questions of property: uncompensated takings;' g impairment of the obli-
gation of contracts;29 ex post facto laws;2' and the extent of the
powers of taxation293 and eminent domain.' 9 This strong emphasis on
287. See, e.g., Andress v. Roberts, 18 Ala. 387 (1850); Nance v. Hemphill, 1 Ala. 551 (1840);
Lynn v. State Bank, 1 Stew. 442 (Ala. 1828); State v. Stebbins, 1 Stew. 299 (Ala. 1828); State v.
Ashley, 1 Ark. 513 (1839); Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253 (1851); Goddin v. Crump, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120
(1837).
288. See, e.g., Alabama & Fla. R.R. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 307 (1864); Gibbons v. Mobile & Great
N. R.R., 36 Ala. 411 (1860); Tennessee & Coasa R.R. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371 (1860); Aldridge v.
Tuscumbra, Courtland, & Decatur R.R., 2 Stew. & P. 199 (Ala. 1832); Cotten v. County Comm'rs,
6 Fla. 610 (1856); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. County Court, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 636 (1854);
Phalen v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. (I Rob.) 713 (1842); Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe & James
River R.R., 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 42 (1840); James River & Kanawha Co. v. Turner, 36 Va. (9 Leigh)
313 (1838); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
289. See, e.g., Herrin v. Buckelew, 37 Ala. 585 (1861); State v. Porter, 1 Ala. 688 (1840);
Johnston v. Atwood, 2 Stew. 225 (Ala. 1829); Ward v. Lewis, I Stew. 26 (Ala. 1827); Carter v.
Dade, 1 Stew. 18 (Ala. 1827); Ex parte Allis, 12 Ark. 101 (1851); State v. Graham, I Ark. 428
(1839); Trustees Internal Improvement Fund v. Bailey, 10 17a. 213 (1863); Taylor v. Smith, 4 Ga. 133
(1848); State v. Corporation of Savannah, 1 Ga. Rep. Annotated (T.U.P.C. 235) 83 (Super. Ct.
Chatham County 1809); State v. Judge of the Fifth Judicial Dist., 5 La. Ann. 756 (1850); Kamper v.
Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 18 (1793).
290. See, e.g., Gibbons, 36 Ala. at 411; Commissioners Court of Lowndes County v. Bowie, 34
Ala. 461 (1859); Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311 (1859); Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853);
Parham v. Justices of the Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341 (1851); Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37 (1850);
Wetherspoon v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 118 (1827); Turner, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) at 313.
291. See, e.g., Blann v. State, 39 Ala. 353 (1864); Kenney, 39 Ala. at 307; Moore, 36 Ala. at
371; Benford v. Gibson, 15 Ala. 521 (1849); Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew. 387 (Ala. 1831); Woodruff
v. State, 3 Ark. 285 (1841); Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190 (1851); Hall v. Carey, 5 Ga. 239 (1848);
Ferguson v. Miners & Mfrs.' Bank, 35 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 363 (1856); Craighead v. State Bank, 19 Tenn.
(Meigs) 198 (1838); Townsendv. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1 (1821); Phalen, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) at 713.
292. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 2 Stew. 228 (Ala. 1829); Wynne's Lessee v. Wynne, 32 Tenn.
(2 Swan) 404 (1852); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 599 (1831); Bell v. Perkins, 7
Tenn. (Peck) 261 (1823); Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) at 1; Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.)
632 (1846).
293. See, e.g., Stein v. City of Mobile, 24 Ala. 591 (1854); Gibson v. County of Pulaski, 2 Ark.
309 (1840); Stevens v. State, 2 Ark. 291 (1840); Cumming v. Mayor & Aldermen, I Ga. Rep.
Annotated (26 R.M.C.) 126 (Super. Ct. 1815); Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424 (1860); Marrv. Enloe,
9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 452 (1830); Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 577 (1856).
294. See, e.g., Kenney, 39 Ala. at 307; State v. Caroline, 20 Ala. 19 (1852); Brown v. Beatty,
34 Miss. 227 (1857); Barrows v. Page, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 97 (1818).
The substantive business of the state supreme courts appears to have differed little from the sub-
stantive business of the United States Supreme Court during the same period. For a discussion of the
United States Supreme Court's focus on property issues during the early 1800s, see generally DAVID
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888
(1985). Of course, the mix of cases heard by federal and state courts before 1865 differed substantially
from the mix that those courts hear today. See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121, 133-55 (1977) (describing the evolution of state court
dockets from cases arising from commercial disputes involving private parties to cases arising from
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the legal treatment of property seems to bear out the position taken by
some historians that the South, contrary to the agrarian myth, was in most
respects as capitalistic and preoccupied with economic success as the
North. 295
Methodologically, the Southern courts employed all the techniques of
constitutional interpretation familiar to the period. Principal reliance was
placed on the language of the text and what the courts seemed to view as
logical deductions from the text.2' Other sources less frequently invoked
included the intentions of the framers of the state constitutions; the
provisions of English law; treatise writers like Story, Blackstone, and
Vattel; and the decisions of sister states from all regions of the
nation 29-the common building blocks of constitutional decision making
throughout the nation. The only Southern flavor to the judicial use of
confrontations between citizens and the state). It is only comparatively recently that courts, state or
federal, have had a docket consisting of a large number of cases involving individual rights. See, e.g.,
LEE EPSTEIN Er AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 74 (1994) (showing that the proportion of
the United States Supreme Court's caseload devoted to cases dealing with due process, substantive
rights, and equality rose from 7.8% in the 1930s to 56.7% in the 1980s).
295. See, e.g., DEGLER, supra note 41, at 65; HARTZ, supra note 74, at 134-39; MCWHINEY,
supra note 121, at vii, 8; Pessen, supra note 83, at 1146, 1149. Horwitz has shown convincingly that
this period was one in which state courts actively reshaped the law to facilitate modem, capitalistic
business enterprise. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977).
296. The Tennessee Supreme Court is notable in this respect for its reliance on what the judges
probably viewed as simple common sense. Unlike some other decisions of the period, the Tennessee
decisions almost never rely on any kind of authority-not treatises, not decisions by sister states, not
even their own precedents. A striking example of this is the court's decision in State v. Fleming, 26
Tenn. (7 Hum.) 151, 154 (1846), in which the court struck down on separation of powers grounds a
state law dismissing pending criminal prosecutions. The court cites no authority in its opinion despite
the fact that only two years earlier it had issued a major separation of powers decision in Governor v.
Porter, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 165 (1844). The earlier decision invalidated a legislative attempt to dictate
the interpretation to be given a statute and contained much relevant analysis. On the other hand, it was
not uncommon even much later in American history for state courts to reach decisions without citing
any authority. See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 796 (1981) (calculating that as late as 1870, nearly one quarter of
state supreme court decisions cited no authority).
297. Except for Tennessee, which looked more frequently to North Carolina, from which it was
formed, the Southern courts do not display any discernible preference for the decisions of Southern
states. See Act Admitting the State of Tennessee, I Stat. 491 (1796). Mississippi looked somewhat
more frequently to Alabama, presumably because both were created from the same territory. See Act
Creating Territorial Government of Alabama,'3 Stat. 371 (1817).
Furthermore, Southern courts continued freely to refer to decisions from Northern states even
after secession. See, e.g., Exparte Tate, 39 Ala. 254, 260-70 (1864) (relying on decisions from Ohio,
New Hampshire, Illinois, and Massachusetts); Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 458, 462 (1863) (referring to
decisions from New Jersey and New Hampshire); Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429, 439-40 (1863) (citing
cases from Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey); Trustees Internal Improvement Fund v.
Bailey, 10 Fla. 213, 230 (1863) (citing a Massachusetts decision); Exparte Mayer, 27 Tex. 715, 722-
23 (1864) (referring to a case in Massachusetts); Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387, 394-95 (1862)
(citing cases from Massachusetts).
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authority was an occasional invocation of the writings of John C.
Calhoun. 98
Other than the text itself, the most frequently cited authority was
undoubtedly the United States Supreme Court, which Southern courts
clearly held in high regard not only during the antebellum period but even
well after secession. Indeed, the authority of the United States Supreme
Court was only enhanced in the South by its fateful decision in Dred Scott,
and the Court was subsequently praised for being "faithful to the [United
States] [c]onstitution, while every other branch of the [United States]
government seemed to conspire its overthrow .... Chief Justice
Taney, so often reviled in the North, was in Southern judicial eyes
"venerable and illustrious " " and an "enlightened jurist and venerated
patriot. ""' The Supreme Court's proslavery decisions, if anything,
cemented the commonalities of Southern and American constitutional
jurisprudence just as they helped unravel the corresponding political
relationships.
But the similarities binding Southern state constitutional jurisprudence
to the general American variety go much deeper than the subject matter or
methodology of constitutional decision making. What the Southern deci-
sions ultimately reveal is a fundamental belief that the constitutions of the
United States and the various states, regardless of region, are merely
independent instantiations of a single set of common American values and
principles. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the 1852 decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court in Campbell v. State.3" In Campbell, a criminal
defendant convicted of manslaughter challenged his conviction on the
ground that admission into evidence of the dying declaration of the victim
violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Georgia Constitution then in effect con-
tained no equivalent provision.3 The state argued, logically enough,
that the federal Bill of Rights did not restrain state power-a point settled
by the United States Supreme Court twenty years earliera-and that in
the absence of any binding constitutional restriction the state was free to do
as it pleased.
The Georgia Supreme Court, untroubled by the lack of a confrontation
clause in the state constitution, rejected this argument. According to the
court, the question was not whether the amendments in the federal Bill of
298. See, e.g., Tate, 39 Ala. at 258-59 (1864); Exparte Hill, 38 Ala. 458, 478, 480-82 (1863);
Daly v. Harris, 33 Ga. 38, 50 (1864).
299. Hill, 38 Ala. at 436.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 456 (Stone, J., concurring).
302. 11 Ga. 353 (1852).
303. See GA. CONST. of 1798.
304. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
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Rights "were intended to operate as a restriction upon the government of
the United States, but whether it is competent for a State Legislature...
to pass an Act directly impairing the great principles of protection to
person and property, embraced in these amendments?" 3" The court
continued:
That the power to pass any law infringing on these principles is
taken from the Federal Government, no one denies. But is it a part
of the reserved rights of a State to do this? May the Legislature of
a State, for example, unless restrained by its own Constitution, pass
a law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
. . . ?" If so, of what avail . . . is the negation of these powers to
the General Government? . . . Now, the doctrine is [argued], that
Congress may not exercise this power, but that each State Legislature
may do so for itself. As if a National religion and State religion, a
National press and State press, were quite separate and distinct from
each other; and that the one might be subject to control, but the other
not!30
Any such doctrine, the court concluded, is to be rejected because
"notwithstanding we may have different governments, a nation within a
nation, imperium in imperio, we have but one people; ...it is in [vain]
to shield them from a blow aimed by the Federal arm, if they are liable to
be prostrated by one dealt with equal fatality by their own [state]." 3 7
The federal Bill of Rights, then, is not merely a restraint on federal power;
its purpose was "to declare to the world the fixed and unalterable
determination of our people, that these invaluable rights ... should never
be disturbed by any government."3"8 The Bill of Rights thus does not
merely establish positive restrictions on the national government but rather
acknowledges "that independently of written constitutions, there are
restrictions upon the legislative power, growing out of the nature of the
civil compact and the natural rights of man." 3" It is these underlying
principles-principles shared in common by all Americans-that "constitute
a limit to all legislative power, Federal or State, beyond which it cannot
go. ,310
Similar expressions of a belief in universal constitutional principles
appear in several other cases from this period. In Exparte Martin,3 ' for
305. Campbell, I 1 Ga. at 365.
306. Id. at 365-66.
307. Id. at 366.
308. Id. at 367 (emphasis in original).
309. Id. at 369.
310. Id. at 372.
311. 13 Ark. 198 (1853).
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example, decided in 1853, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down a state
law providing for reclamation of swampland and levee construction because
the law failed to compensate landowners. "The constitution of this State,"
the court conceded, "contains no provision that private property shall not
be taken for public use, without just compensation . . 312
Nevertheless, the court continued, "[t]he duty of making compensation may
be regarded as a law of natural justice, which has its sanction in every
man's sense of right, and is recognized in the most arbitrary
governments." 3 3 This holding accords with a proposition announced by
the Arkansas Supreme Court in one of its earliest cases to the effect that
the constitutions of the states are to be understood as so many "bill[s] of
rights, declaratory of the great and essential principles of civil and political
justice. "314
The belief that all American constitutions instantiate the same set of
values and principles is also manifested during this period by a not uncom-
mon judicial tendency to treat state constitutions, the United States
Constitution, and "the great and essential principles of civil and political
justice" as interchangeable."' One example of this approach is State v.
Moor,316 an 1823 Mississippi case in which a criminal defendant chal-
lenged his conviction under the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Despite the fact that the
Mississippi Constitution of 1817 contained its own double jeopardy
clause, 17 the Mississippi Supreme Court based its ruling on the United
States Constitution, which it held applicable to the states, and never even
mentioned the equivalent state constitutional provision. 318  The court
nevertheless went on to base its double jeopardy ruling on principles of
English common law.319 In a similar case, the Tennessee Supreme Court
312. Id. at 206.
313. Id.
314. State v. Ashley, I Ark. 513, 513 (1839); see also Gibson v. County of Pulaski, 2 Ark. 309,
313 (1840) (invalidating a tax on the keeping of stallions as violating a "common right"); Ex parte
Allis, 12 Ark. 101, 105 (1851) (ruling that the state constitution must be interpreted "in conne[ct]ion
with known political truths").
315. Ashley, 1 Ark. at 513. Interestingly, this trend may stand in some opposition to a contrary
trend of treating the common law in a more functional, flexible, and ultimately positivistic way. See
HORWITz, supra note 295, at 1-3, 30 (discussing the trend of nineteenth century judges to use the
common law instrumentally to create social change and policy). The impulse, however, seems under-
standable in light of the sentiment that constitutions, unlike the common law, really are expressions of
fundamental principles of justice, designed to last in perpetuity.
316. 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 134 (1823).
317. See Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 13.
318. See Moor, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) at 138-40.
319. As late as 1864, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that powers of "the legislatures of
the free States of America" differed little from the powers of the English Parliament and turned to
English precedents for guidance. Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N.C. (Win.) 325, 328 (1864); see also Brown
v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227,239 (1857) (holding that the power of eminent domain is inherent in state sov-
ereignty and requires no express constitutional recognition).
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invalidated a state law having a "retrospective effect." 32 Although the
state constitution expressly prohibited ex post facto laws,32' the court
never mentioned the provision. Instead, the court, after setting out certain
principles of English common law, ruled that these common law principles
governed the case because they were "eternal principles of justice which
no government has a right to disregard." 3" The legislature, the court
concluded, is not free to do everything not forbidden by the state
constitution: "Some acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against
the plain and obvious dictates of reason."3"
The offhand way in which these courts dealt with state constitutional
law, federal constitutional law, and English common law suggests strongly
that the courts do not differentiate between them. The congruence of these
bodies of law is simply assumed on the ground that all three reflect
substantially identical principles of justice, reason, or natural law.324
These principles, moreover, are understood to be the common inheritance
of all Americans, and that they turn up in a variety of places, such as the
various state and federal constitutions, is viewed as an historical
artifact-the consequence of political events unrelated to the substance of
the underlying universal principles.3"
In sum, judicial interpretations of antebellum and Confederate era
Southern constitutions do not simply fail to support the hypothesis that
distinctive Southern character traits and values are manifest in state
constitutions of the period, but suggest just the opposite. The court
decisions, like the constitutional texts themselves, tend to show that the
320. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 599, 599 (1831).
321. See TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 11.
322. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (1 Yer.) at 603 (opinion of Green, J.) (emphasis added).
323. Id. (emphasis added); see also Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347, 365-66 (1862) ("There are certain
first principles which underlie all governments and all organized society, the violation of which the
framers of governments are not supposed to intend."). A belief in the congruence of common law,
natural law, and constitutional law is also suggested in many of the popular arguments made by oppo-
nents and proponents of slavery concerning its constitutionality. For an overview, see WIECEK, supra
note 88, at 228-75.
324. For further examples emphasizing the natural law roots of this approach to constitutional
interpretation, see SuzannaSherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 183-222 (1992)
(examining the reliance on natural law in the state court decisions of Massachusetts, New York, South
Carolina, and Virginia).
325. A notable exception to this approach is that of the Alabama Supreme Court, which repeatedly
held that the United States Constitution did not apply to the states and that state constitutions could not
be assumed to embody universal principles of natural law. See Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216 (1859)
(describing the power of the state as limited only by the will of the people "in the aggregate," and the
state constitution as not restrained by inherent, fundamental principles of democracy); Noles v. State,
24 Ala. 672 (1854) (holding that the Fifth Amendmentwas intended to safeguard against encroachments
by the federal government, not to restrict the state's powers); Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510 (1850)
(holding that the Constitutional provision guaranteeing a right to trial by jury restricts only the federal
government, not the states).
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Southern states participated in and unreservedly embraced a constitutional
culture that was American in character and national in scope.
V. The Nature of American Nationalism
I have thus far suggested two principal reasons why Southern constitu-
tions fail to reflect a distinctively Southern character or set of values.
First, it may well be that the South and the North were never very different
from one another as a matter of historical fact. 316 Second, even if the
South was significantly different from the rest of the nation, it was not dif-
ferent in ways that are likely to be reflected in a liberal, American-style
constitution.3 7  In this Part, I suggest a third reason: the nature of
American nationalism. Southern secessionism was a proto-nationalistic
movement that attempted to transfer Southerners' existing loyalties from
the United States to a new state defined in territorial, cultural, and some-
times ethnic and religious terms. Such a transfer would have been difficult
under any circumstances, but in American circumstances it was far more
difficult because American nationalism has never been defined in
territorial, ethnic, or cultural terms. American nationalism, on the
contrary, is an ideological nationalism: it is based on a commitment to a
set of ideas. Consequently, to replace American nationalism with Southern
nationalism would have required Southerners to embrace not only a new
object of national loyalty, but also a new kind of nationalism as well.
Southern nationalism, then, failed in part because Southerners could not or
did not wish to relinquish the ideas to which their American identity had
previously committed them-the very ideas that were first embodied, and
then retained, in Southern constitutions.
A. American Nationalism: Ideology and Universalism
Nationalism is usually associated with a variety of commonalities with
which it often coexists-commonalities of language, culture, religion,
ethnicity, or territory, for example.328 The frequency with which groups
nowadays demand "[t]hat political boundaries should coincide with ethno-
graphic or linguistic frontiers"329 and the increasing intensity around the
globe of nationalisms based on ethnicity and religion330 sometimes make
326. See supra Part III.
327. See supra subpart IV(A).
328. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 162, at 14 (viewing these commonalities as the bonds that
usually delimit a social group as a nationality); SNYDER, supra note 162, at 14-55 (providing views of
the term nation from geography, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and political science).
329. KOHN, supra note 162, at 17.
330. Numerous recent works address this subject. For arguments about the great power of ethnic
nationalism around the globe, see WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR
UNDERSTANDING 42-46 (1994) (arguing that the conflict underlying disputes over national identity is
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it difficult to conceive of a nationalism understood in any other terms. Yet
authorities on nationalism have long criticized this customary view of the
subject as superficial33' or even incoherent, 332 and it seems clear that
the association of nationalism with the traditional laundry list of common-
alities gives at best a partial picture of the subject.
Nationalism, it is generally agreed, was born alongside the doctrine
of popular sovereignty.333  It arose in Enlightenment England at the
moment when political ideology began to "locateo the source of individual
identity within a 'people,' which [was] seen as the bearer of sovereignty,
the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity." 3 4 As
based on ethnic differences rather than on religious, linguistic, or other differences); SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER 106-09
(1996) (describing the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in China and its effect on China's future
development, as well as the increasing importance of ethnic nationalism in the whole of Asia);
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM 5-16 (1993)
(describing the role of ethnic nationalism in the global disintegration of nation-states into ethnic civil
war); WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS: CIVILIZATION AND THE FURIES OF NATIONALISM
87-89 (1993) (describing the role of ethnic nationalism in the ethnic conflicts of Eastern Europe). For
an argument that ethnic nationalism is increasingly important, but not in a state-based form, see JOEL
KOTKIN, TRIBES: How RACE, RELIGION, AND IDENTITY DETERMINE SUCCESS IN THE NEW GLOBAL
ECONOMY 3-13 (1992) (arguing that ethnic nationalism, transcending state borders, will play a crucial
role in the evolution of the global economy). For an argument that increases in ethnic nationalism have
been overstated, see E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH,
REALITY 63-67 (1991). For an argument that the decline of nationalism is inevitable due to advances
in communications and transportation resulting in a global "placelessness," see WILLIAM KNOKE, BOLD
NEW WORLD: THE ESSENTIAL ROAD MAP TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 18-54 (1996). For an
argument that nationalistic particularism is increasing simultaneously with a contrary trend toward
globalism, see BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 9 (1995). For an argument that present
trends toward globalism cannot survive, see ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 157-75 (1991).
Finally, for an intriguing attempt to reconcile the kind of liberal universalism behind global cosmopol-
itanism with the apparently contrary particularism behind ethnic nationalistic impulses, see YAEL
TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993).
331. See HOBSBAWM, supra note 330, at 63, 63-67 (calling the genetic approach to ethnicity
"plainly irrelevant"); KOHN, supra note 162, at 13, 6-15 (denouncing theories that claim a nationality
is based on blood or race as lacking "real substance"); SHAFER, supra note 39, at 15-56 (criticizing
most human and environmental explanations of the basis of nations and nationalism as illusory).
332. See, e.g., KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY 3, 1-3 (1953) (criticizing feature descriptions of nationalism
as leaving the real sources of nationalistic thought and action "uncharted"). A recent defender of this
view, however, is Ernest Gellner. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983)
(claiming that the era of nationalism was launched by the acceptance of the notion of the people as the
bearer of sovereignty).
333. See LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 6-8 (1992) (chronicling
the semantic transformation of the word "nation" and its attendant conceptual revolution, from meaning
"an elite" to becoming synonymous with "people"); ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM I (4th ed. 1993)
(stating that an essential component of nationalism is the view that "the only legitimate type of
government is national self-government"); KOHN, supra note 162, at 3 (stating that nationalism is
"inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding"); SHAFER, supra note 39, at 97-117
(tracing the development of modem nationalism to the rise of republican ideals in the eighteenth
century).
334. GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 3; see also HOBSBAWM, supra note 330, at 18-19 (explaining
that the early concept of the nation was of a single body of citizens "whose collective sovereignty
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the people in their collective capacity began to replace the king as the locus
of sovereignty, the people themselves came to be identified with the nation
in a way that had formerly been reserved for the monarch.
From this common starting point, however, nationalism evolved in
two quite different directions. One branch of nationalism stressed its
democratic origins. This nationalism implied "symbolic elevation of the
people," 3 5 and "was fundamentally liberal and universal, carrying a mes-
sage for all mankind and implying (if not always granting) the liberty and
equality of every individual. 33 6  Liberal nationalism proclaimed wher-
ever it was found that "a nation of free men has emerged, free politically
as well as spiritually, without kings, aristocracy or priesthood .... "
Another kind of nationalism, however, also arose from the same root.
In this kind of nationalism, "national identity tends to be associated
with and confounded with a community's sense of uniqueness and the
qualities contributing to it."338  As a result, the social, cultural, or
ethnic qualities that make a people unique or identifiable to itself or others
acquire special significance; the sovereign people becomes "a unique
sovereign people."33 9  This kind of nationalism can be collectivistic,
authoritarian, and exclusive. Unlike the liberal variety, in which
nationality is civic and ideological, and may thus in principle be acquired,
nationality of the collectivist kind is ethnic or cultural, and therefore
limited to a distinct and identifiable populace. 3" It is to this latter kind
of nationalism that distinctions of language, religion, culture, and ethnicity
become important.
In its most extreme forms, Southern nationalism, as we have seen, was
of the latter sort. Its proponents appealed for allegiance to a new nation
defined primarily by geography and culture; occasionally Southern nation-
alists went so far as to appeal to linguistic and religious differences as
constituted them a state which was their political expression"); POTTER, supra note 48, at 38-45
(observing that historians often use nationalism as a way of answering questions about the legitimacy
of political power exercised by a particular group within a particular territory).
335. GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 10.
336. KOHN, supra note 162, at 167.
337. Id. at 171.
338. GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 8.
339. Id.
340. See id. at 11. For slightly different typologies of nationalisms, see CARLTON J.H. HAYES,
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALISM 303-11 (1931) (dividing nationalism into cate-
gories of humanitarian nationalism, Jacobin nationalism, traditional nationalism, liberal nationalism,
and integral nationalism); GELLNER, supra note 332, at 88-109 (examining various combinations of
power, educational access, and cultural diversity to create a typology of nationalism); SMrrIH, supra
note 330, at 9-13 (explaining that every nationalism is informed by tensions between a dominant civic
nationalism, based on a community of shared legal institutions, and a weaker ethnic nationalism, which
emphasizes immutable native culture).
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well."al In these respects, the strongest form of Southern nationalism
closely resembled the kind of Romantic, ethnicity-centered nationalisms of
the nineteenth century with which it was contemporary-for example, the
German volk-based nationalism inspired by Fichte and Hegel. 42
The American nationalism which Southern secessionists sought to
displace, however, was of a different sort. Imported from England with
the earliest settlers, American nationalism asserted itself not from outside
the English linguistic, ethnic, and cultural patrimony, but from within it.
Americans sought independence to vindicate rights they held not on account
of their status as a distinct people but on account of being English.1'3
What made this paradox possible were the universal aspirations of the
Anglo-American ideology of liberty, an ideology that understood liberty to
be a universal human right.' Thus, American nationalism "was not
founded on the common attributes of nationhood-language, cultural
tradition, historical territory or common descent-but on an idea .... To
become an American has always meant to identify oneself with the
idea. "I
The content of that idea, of course, is difficult to define with
precision. Hans Kohn describes it as a philosophy of natural rights derived
from the ideology of the English revolutionary period of the seventeenth
341. See supra subsection III(B)(6).
342. See GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 476 ("The nascent Southern ideology bears unmistakable
resemblance to the Romantic ethnic nationalisms such as the German and Russian ones."); KEDOURIE,
supra note 333, at 56-69 (describing the importance of language in defining the German nation); HANS
KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY 114 (1957) (placing expressions of
Southern nationalism within the framework of nineteenth century European nationalist movements).
343. See GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 405-20 (stating that the formation of a unique American
identity did not interfere with Americans' English national identity); KOHN, supra note 162, at 272
(claiming that "the colonies could and did revolt only because they were English").
344. See GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 412, 422-23 (observing that Americans pledged them-
selves to the principle of universal liberty much more ardently than did the English before them);
KOHN, supra note 342, at 9 (noting that the natural rights of Englishmen were broadened by eighteenth
century ideas to become the universal rights of mankind).
345. KOHN, supra note 342, at 8-9; see also HOBSBAWM, supra note 330, at 88 ("Americans are
those who wish to be."). Connor goes so far as to suggest that Americans might be entirely unable
to produce an ethnic nationalism: "Mhe absence of a common origin may well make it more difficult,
and conceivably impossible, for the American to appreciate instinctively the idea of the nation in the
same dimension and with the same poignant clarity as do the Japanese, the Bengali, or the Kikuyu."
CONNOR, supra note 330, at 95. A dissenting position is taken by Michael Lind, who argues that
American nationalism is based primarily on race. See MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION:
THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26-36 (1995). Lind's argument,
however, which is based on the history of race relations in America, relies on a false distinction
between culture and political ideology; surely the latter is partly constitutive of the former. A better
explanation for the role of race in American nationalism is provided by Samuel Huntington, who argues
that the most salient characteristic of American history is a commitment to high ideals accompanied by
a constant failure to live up to them. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 221 (1981).
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century." Samuel Huntington uses the shorthand phrase "the American
Creed," which he defines as a notion of "liberty, equality, individualism,
democracy, and the rule of law under a constitution" that draws on
seventeenth-century Protestantism and Lockean and Enlightenment ideas of
natural rights and social contracts. 47  Americans, according to
Huntington, were defined from the beginning as those who "hold these
truths to be self-evident"; as a result, "national identity and political
principles were inseparable." s
Based as it was on a set of political beliefs, American nationalism was
far removed from the territorial nationalisms of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. Indeed, as Liah Greenfeld explains, one of the earliest dis-
putes faced by Americans concerned "what was to be the concrete geo-
political referent of the American national loyalty."" Tories feared that
separation from Great Britain would lead to disintegration. Federalists
contemplated a single nation of continental scope. Anti-Federalists doubted
the possibility of a continental nation that was capable of ruling legitimately
as the object of popular loyalty rather than through force and tyranny.'
The Constitution itself, by setting up a federal system that contemplates
popular loyalties shifting between the state and national governments,35. '
seems to equivocate on "the question of what was, or whether there was,
the American nation. ,352
The issue of the proper territorial embodiment of American national-
ism was further complicated by the continual westward expansion of the
nation. Where was the proper repository of American ideals? The eastern
seaboard? Non-Spanish North America? The entire continent, or beyond?
The very idea of Manifest Destiny reveals starkly the American belief in
the United States as "a new Canaan for those who wished to throw off the
yoke of Egyptian oppression. 35 3 As the bearer of a universal message
for all mankind, 5" America, wherever located, was in principle open to
all who shared its ideals regardless of culture, ethnicity, or religion.
America was thus open to the immigrant, whose loyalty "did not derive
from the love of country [but] from the uplifting, dignifying effects of
346. See KOHN, supra note 342, at 9.
347. HUNTINGTON,supra note 345, at 14-15. Similar accounts are given by Belz, supra note 202,
at 20; and MCCARDELL, supra note 57, at 6, 336.
348. HUNTINGTON, supra note 345, at 24.
349. GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 403.
350. See id. at 423-26.
351. See THE FEDERALUST No. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining that the people have ultimate authority in a federalist system).
352. GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 423 (emphasis in original).
353. KOHN, supra note 162, at 310.
354. See id. at 167, 273; GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 422-23, 437 (describing the message of
the universality of liberty as a part of the American Revolution, westward expansion, and immigration).
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liberty and equality, the exhilarating lure of opportunity, and the enjoyment
or even the expectation of a greater prosperity.
355
This fluidity in the concept of a territorially embodied America goes
a long way toward accounting for the way in which Southern secession
occurred. Radical Southern secessionists sought to replace an ideological
American nationalism with one based on ethnicity, culture, and territory.
Yet they soon found that their arguments were better received when framed
within the long-standing debate concerning the proper territorial embodi-
ment of the traditional, ideological American nationalism. Thus, secession-
ists like Davis soon found themselves arguing not that the South was the
territorial embodiment of a Southern ideal, but that it was the territorial
embodiment of the American ideal itself. Secessionists ended up arguing,
that is, that America was properly understood to be located in the South
because that was where American ideals were most fully realized.
356 Of
course, Southerners who made this argument were wrong-slavery was
irreconcilably at war with basic American ideals of liberty and equality.
Nevertheless, the version of Confederate nationalism that had the greatest
impact and survived the longest did not propose a new identity based on a
distinct culture or set of values, but proposed instead only a new territorial
embodiment for an existing, common identity and set of values. 357 It is
for this reason that Southern constitutions and judicial decisions interpreting
them--the official record and embodiment of Southern principles of self-
government-contain not even a trace of anything that might be considered
a distinctively Southern value.
B. Constitutional Disagreement in the American Nation
If this view is correct, it casts considerable doubt on the belief,
associated with the New Judicial Federalism, that the various states differ
materially in their fundamental values and political character. If being
American implies a dedication to a set of common principles, ones held to
be universally valid not only for all Americans but potentially for all
humankind, then the possibility seems slight that the denizens of any
American state, whether in the South or elsewhere, would diverge materi-
ally from those principles. 351
355. GREENFELD, supra note 333, at 435.
356. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
357. See KOHN, supra note 342, at 106, 114-15 ("They separated from the Union not because they
wished to assert themselves as un-American, but because they believed themselves the better
Americans, more faithful to the original idea.").
358. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 345, at 61-75 (describing the difficulty that Americans have
in changing their beliefs because of the centrality of those beliefs to their identity as Americans, and
the various strategies they have adopted to deal with the tension caused by Americans' frequent failures
to live up to their own principles). As to regions other than the South, one wonders what the Oregon
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By no means, however, does this ideological uniformity imply
unanimity. The content of the underlying American ideals is open to
dispute, and is in fact continually disputed. Indeed, constitutional law itself
is sometimes understood as a forum in which Americans debate the content
of their principles and the nature of their identity.359 But the ideological
grounding and universalism of American nationalism does carry implica-
tions for the meaning of constitutional disagreements among state and fed-
eral courts. The nature of American nationalism suggests that such
disagreements are asserted not from without the system of American values
by Virginians or Oregonians or New Yorkers possessed of a constitution-
ally distinct character or set of values, but from within the American iden-
tity by a polity that shares it at the constitutional level. Such disputes, that
is, are internal disputes over the content of a common identity and common
values.
This conclusion, in turn, has significant implications for the way in
which state constitutions should be interpreted. It means, at a minimum,
that state constitutions should not be approached from the perspective of
some hypothetical, unique state character but from the perspective of a
common American character. Consequently, as Paul Kahn has written,
state courts need not rely on "unique state sources""O to support inter-
pretations of state constitutions; rather, they should treat state constitutions
as attempts "to realize for [state] cormmunities the ideals that are the com-
mon heritage of the nation." 361
Court of Appeals, see supra note 20, or the Alaska Supreme Court, see supra note 28, might make of
the following passage from a leading recent book on the history of the American West:
Of all the meanings assigned to Western independence, none had more emotional
power than the prospect of becoming independent of the past. But Western Americans
did what most travelers do; they took their'problems with them. Cultural baggage is not,
after all, something one retains or discards at will. While much of the Western replication
of familiar ways was voluntary and intentional, other elements of continuity appear to
have caught Westerners by surprise-as if parts of their own character were specters
haunting them despite an attempt at exorcism by migration. No wonder, then, that
emigrants made so much of their supposed new identity; no wonder they pressed the case
of their supposed adaptations to the new environment, their earned status as real
Westerners. Accenting the factor of their migration and new location, Westerners tried
to hold the ghosts of their old, imported identities at bay.
The West had no magic power for dissolving the past, a fact that Americans
confronted at all levels, from the personal to the national.
PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN
WEST 90(1987). Another historian of the American West recently wrote that Western regional identity
is even weaker than Southern regional identity, lacking as it does "the heritage of Southerners, shaped
by slavery, rebellion, defeat, and the civil rights struggle." Michael E. McGerr, Is There a Twentieth-
Century West?, in UNDER AN OPEN SKY, supra note 62, at 239, 241.
359. See supra note 4.
360. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1147, 1147 (1993).
361. Id. at 1166.
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Similarly, state courts need not justify divergences from federal consti-
tutional law in terms of unique state values or character because the diver-
gences reflect no such thing. When a state court disagrees with federal
interpretations of the United States Constitution, its disagreement is one
among joint participants in a common American tradition; and it is a dis-
agreement arising within that tradition, not outside it. Consequently, as a
coequal participant with federal courts in the interpretation of a common
constitutional heritage, a state court is entitled to part company with the
United States Supreme Court for no other reason than, in the state court's
view, the Supreme Court has gotten it wrong. 362
The academic community has loudly criticized this position.363
Clearly, the criticism has had an effect. State courts seem far less willing
in recent years to dispute United States Supreme Court rulings on the
merits;3" instead, they seek support for divergent rulings with
362. I hope in a future work to show that this result is not only consistent with, but dictated by,
the constitutional framework of federalism.
363. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1981) (noting the tendency of courts and commentators
to "brush aside . . . core considerations that underlie constitutionalism at the state level ... in their
scurry to foil philosophically unaccommodating federal precedents"); George Deukmejian & Clifford
K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 975, 975 (1979) (discussing the various dangers of the trend by some state
courts to use state constitutions to supplant the federal Constitution as the basis for judicial review of
the actions by branches of state government); Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial
Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 779, 786 (1982) (finding state
judicial activism in interpreting state constitutional provisions differently than the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted federal provisions to be problematic when based on ideological differences); Ken
Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, I EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONsr. L. 29, 35
(1988) (observing that courts have "begun to demand more than mere disagreement" with the U.S.
Supreme Court as a basis for creating new law under their own constitutions); Howard, supra note 14,
at 1, 12-13 (noting the "danger that use of state constitutions will be simply 'reactive,'" in that a judge
who is disappointed with a U.S. Supreme Court doctrine will resort to the state constitution to achieve
the preferred result); Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 85, 95 (1985) (criticizing state court divergence because it is often
inspired by disagreement with the U.S. Supreme Court and "appears unseemingly result-oriented and
unprincipled"); Kaye, supra note 15, at 399, 418 ("An argument for a broader construction under a
state constitution than that established under the federal Constitution requires more than merely urging
that some other result is preferred."); Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a
Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 300 (1977) (calling for stan-
dards for determining when and how a state constitution should be used to protect against unprincipled,
result-oriented state decisions).
364. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (Ill. 1984) ("[W]e should not suddenly
change course and go our separate way simply to accommodate the desire of the defendant to circum-
vent what he perceives as a narrowing of his [federal] fourth amendment rights . . . ."); State v.
Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 173 (N.J. 1996) ('[I]t is not enough to say that because we disagree with
a majority opinion of the Supreme Court, we should invoke our State Constitution to achieve a contrary
result." (quoting State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 815 (N.J. 1990) (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986) (arguing that departures
from federal precedent should be "principled" and should be "made for well founded legal reasons and
not by merely substituting our notion of justice for that of ... the United States Supreme Court").
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justifications that go beyond mere disagreement. Yet this lack of
confidence has driven state courts to search desperately for alternative ways
to justify divergence from federal law, including the notion of unique state
character. In making arguments based on unique state character and
values, however, these courts have embraced a kind of justification that has
no basis in fact, a development that can only further reduce the credibility
of state constitutional decision making-credibility that state courts can ill
afford to squander.
VI. Conclusion
Interpreting state constitutions in light of some supposed unique state
values and character is a tempting strategy for state courts confused about
the role assigned to them by federalism, uncertain about their relationship
to the federal courts, and unaccustomed, after a long period of deferring
reflexively to the Supreme Court, to being called upon for leadership in the
protection of popular liberties. The proposition that every state polity has
a unique and distinctive character guiding its constitutional choices appeals
nicely to sentiments of chauvinism and local boosterism. Like modem
Norman Vincent Peales, state courts tend to serve up the state's unique
character and values in a way that seems calculated to build local self-
esteem, much as the state's mouth-watering cuisine or unsurpassed trout
fishing might be touted in other contexts. The unique state character thesis
also allows state courts to occupy a comfortable and unthreatening position
between state and national authority: it gives them just enough authority to
assert a modicum of independence in constitutional interpretation, but not
so much as to permit them to move from beneath the national umbrella.
The existence of these unique state values and characters, however, is
principally a matter of faith: the evidence provides no hint of them. Surely
if any part of the nation in any period might be expected to have displayed
a distinct character and set of values, it would be the antebellum and
Confederate South. Yet the historical and constitutional records tell a
different story. As a matter of historical fact, according to historians who
study the South, any differences between the South and North in culture,
character, or values were slight-too slight, at least, to have played any
significant role in the events that led to the decisions of Southern states to
secede from the Union, and too slight by far to support contemporary
In a recent survey, Latzer demonstrates that state courts have most often followed the Supreme Court
in the area of constitutional criminal procedure. See BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW § 1:1, at 1-2 (1995). For a notable exception, see Hempele, 576 A.2d at 814-15
("[Tihe trouble with [the federal cases dealing with searches of garbage] is that they are flatly and
simply wrong as the matter of the way people think about garbage" (internal quotation marks deleted)).
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impressions, which have been artificially inflated by more than a century
of political propaganda and romantic mythologizing.
This conclusion is borne out by examination of the Constitution of the
Confederate States of America and the various constitutions of the individ-
ual Southern states in force between the Revolution and the Civil War, as
well as the many judicial decisions interpreting them. There is quite
simply no sign in these documents or in the body of judicial decisions, of
any value or character trait that might be thought of as distinctively
Southern. If anything, the constitutions and opinions show quite the
opposite: that Southern courts and constitution makers accepted and openly
embraced the most broadly national aspects of American constitutional
tradition. Indeed, they went further: in several decisions the highest courts
of Southern states unmistakably took the position that the national
Constitution, the various state constitutions, and the inherited body of
common law should be understood as separate instantiations of a single,
unified body of universal constitutional principles. It is hard to imagine a
position more directly opposed to the New Judicial Federalism's hypothesis
of unique state characters and values.
One possible explanation for this lack of Southern differentiation lies
in the nature of American nationalism. Unlike other nationalisms based on
territory, culture, ethnicity, or religion, American nationalism is an ideo-
logical nationalism based upon a shared commitment to a set of political
ideals. If being American means sharing a set of values and ideals, then
doubt is cast on more than historical claims concerning the distinctiveness
of the South of a bygone era-doubt is cast as well on contemporary claims
by contemporary courts that their state constitutions must be interpreted in
light of the distinct character and values of the present state populace.
We live in an age that seems obsessed by the concept of difference.
The identification and acknowledgement of differences undoubtedly has its
place. Many of these differences create obstacles to shared understanding
and appreciation that are difficult enough to accommodate, much less to
transcend. In such an environment, to imagine differences where none
exist or to elevate insignificant differences to the status of obstacles to the
achievement of common goals seems a deeply misguided enterprise. The
doctrine of unique state characters and values is a step in this wrong
direction. It should be abandoned.
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